

November 15, 1941

# SOCIAL ACTION

**The  
Struggle for  
World Order**

BY

VERA MICHELES DEAN

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# NAZI BLUEPRINT of EUROPE & AFRICA



# Building for the Future

by R. L. Calhoun

It has become almost proverbial that in 1918 the Allies and the United States won the First World War and then in 1919-39 lost the peace they had fought for. One main reason was that before 1919 the peoples on the victorious side had given so little thought to the immensely difficult problems of making a peace that would last. They did not know what to demand from their representatives at Versailles. They did not recognize the dangerous trends in world affairs during 1919-31, when these might still have been controlled. They had not realized the vital necessity of hardheaded planning for peace, and of patient, responsible, determined action to make the planning effective.

Today we are in the midst of another world war. There are honest differences of judgment as to what part the United States should play in it, and no certainty as to when or how it will end. But one thing is certain. However the policy of the United States may develop, and whatever the immediate result of the fighting, there will be imperative need for an intelligent, responsible public opinion in this country when the time comes to build again for the future. Many believe that the churches have a peculiar obligation and opportunity to help develop this sort of temper among their own members, and the Council for Social Action shares this belief.

Among the groups now at work to provide means for the growth of such informed conviction concerning international relations, none has a more enviable name for impartial competence than the staff of the Foreign Policy Association, of which Mrs. Vera Micheles Dean is a member. Her incisive analysis of the task we confront, presented in this issue of **SOCIAL ACTION**, is being published also as a new "Headline Book" in the widely known series of brief studies of interna-

tional affairs which she and her colleagues have prepared and the Foreign Policy Association has published during years of continuing research.

The Council for Social Action is especially happy to offer Mrs. Dean's article, **THE STRUGGLE FOR WORLD ORDER**, since it serves as an admirable introduction to some of the problems to be explored by the newly projected "Congregational Christian Study of World Organization." Advance word concerning this project has gone to the ministers of all our churches, and further word will come as the plan progresses. It will involve the cooperation of a group of specialists, and of as many local churches, associations, and conferences as may be willing to help. A report will be presented for full consideration by the General Council at Hanover in 1942.

Meanwhile, for all who desire to help build a realistic Christian public opinion devoted to world peace, whether through the proposed Study or otherwise, here is a brilliant opening survey of the field.



## After the War, What?

At a time when war rages on three continents, it may seem premature to talk of peace. Yet already the future peace is being forged on the anvil of war. Everywhere, as people fight or prepare to resist, they discuss the changes war may bring, the new order that may emerge out of chaos. This struggle for world order reveals both profound dissatisfaction with conditions as they existed on the eve of the Second World War, and profound repugnance for the disorder created by Nazi conquests. It also reveals an undying hope that human intelligence, which has proved so effective in extending the frontiers of scientific knowledge, may yet succeed in solving by peaceful means the problems of relations between men and between nations.

It is natural that countries involved in the conflict should regard the winning of the war as their first objective. But people are coerced, or persuaded, to fight wars chiefly because they think they may thus achieve a more prosperous or more secure existence on restoration of peace. When we speak about peace aims, what we have in mind is not this or that program of territorial, economic or financial measures. What we have in mind is the kind of life we would like to live once the "cease fire!" has sounded. All statements of peace aims, all programs for "new orders," are first and foremost an expression of the philosophy of life desired by a given people or leader. That is why it is of the utmost importance that we should discuss peace aims now, right in the midst of war. Otherwise, we may be as mentally unprepared for peace as we have been mentally unprepared for war.

But we must also realize that, when actual fighting comes to an end, we shall not be able to start with a clean slate. The war will have left terrible destruction in its wake—destruction not only of material things, which can be replaced, but also

of ideas, institutions, the very fabric of human relationships. Already millions of people in Europe and Asia are faced with starvation and disease. Already millions of them, after years of war and revolution, are suffering from the effects of prolonged nervous and physical strain. Many have been driven to despair of the future. Bitter hatreds, which it may take another generation to overcome, have been aroused by the conquests of Germany and Japan. Equally bitter resentment is felt by many in Germany and Japan toward those countries—Britain, Russia, the United States—which are regarded as stumbling blocks to totalitarian expansion.

### THE PERIOD OF RECEIVERSHIP

Whatever the outcome of the war, we must be prepared to pass through a sort of twilight zone between war and peace—a period of receivership and stocktaking. During this period what we shall need most of all will be not a formal peace conference, or a new, hastily rigged-up international organization, but concerted efforts on the part of the survivors to organize rescue work on a world scale. There will be millions of people to feed, to clothe, to rehouse, to re-educate in ways of peaceful living. Only when this task of human rehabilitation has been accomplished, will it be possible to sit down in an atmosphere of relative calm to discuss such questions as territorial adjustments, administration of colonies, access to raw materials, and settlement of financial questions.

Because we are bound to pass through a period of receivership, the most important thing to discuss today is not this or that form of international machinery that may be established after the war, but the principles—the philosophy of life—that can set the machinery in motion. Any piece of machinery, whether it is a lathe or a constitution, is only as good as the people who make it work. The most perfect international organization we draw up on paper may prove completely

# THE WARRING WORLD

(DARK AREAS SHOW STATES INVOLVED IN HOSTILITIES IN 1941)



unworkable in practice for lack of will to operate it, as so frequently happened in the case of the League of Nations. Human institutions cannot be permanently blueprinted in advance, for the simple reason that it is impossible to foresee just what human beings may do under unforeseeable circumstances. Institutions do not spring full-fledged like Athene out of the head of Zeus. They are the result of slow years of growth and adaptation to changing conditions, as we can see in the institutions developed by Britain, the United States, and the British Commonwealth of Nations.

## NO "SOLUTION" IS FINAL

At the same time, we must not believe for a moment that we, as individuals, can have no influence on the future world order. The events in the midst of which we live have been made by men, and are therefore capable of being remedied by men.

But we must also understand that there are no final "solutions" for the various problems of relations between nations, which in the last analysis are relations between human beings.



These problems can no more be permanently "solved" than problems that arise between capital and labor, between the individual and the state, between the child and his family. It is particularly important for us in the United States to understand this, because we are apt to think that if we can only find a ready-made "solution" for this or that problem, it will stay permanently solved. Then we are likely to be disillusioned if wars start up again after we thought they had been safely outlawed on paper.

A peace settlement, at best, represents a series of compromises between conflicting points of view. No compromise achieved at the end of a war can be eternal or equally just to all. What we must learn is that we do not build for the future by standing still. As long as there is life there is bound to be change. Our problem is not to prevent all change—that would only lead to recurring wars and revolutions. Our problem is to arrange things in such a way that changes can be made by peaceful means, and not by resort to force.

No order can be reconstructed intelligently until we know the foundations on which it is based. Like the archeologist, we must dig into the past, study the fragments of ancient structures, understand what they mean, and fit them in where we can into the new structure on which we are at work. This is what we shall try to do in this book. We shall see how plans for world peace have been made through the centuries, and try to discover why the Versailles settlement failed. We shall examine the limits imposed on practical action in international affairs by political and economic factors, by nationalism, by the psychology of peoples. Then we shall compare the future as the Nazis see it with the future as others see it. We shall discuss the difficult problem of what to do about Germany after the war. And we shall try to find out what the United States can do or wants to do in helping the rest of the world to build the post-war order.



# I. Bridging the Centuries

Exploration and conquest have expanded man's horizon across the oceans, and have opened up six continents. The countries that were the cradle of the world's oldest civilizations—India and China—are once more playing an active part in the history of our times. New regions in Africa and South America, still to be mapped out and developed, hold a promise for the future. Yet no matter how much the scope of the known world becomes enlarged, the continent that still draws our attention like a magnet is Europe, whom one English poet has called "mistress of the hearts of men." And it is with Europe that many of the plans for post-war reconstruction are first of all concerned.

But we must always bear in mind that reconstruction of Europe cannot be achieved without reconstruction of other continents. In contrast to 1815, the problem of our time is how to establish a balance of power not between countries on one continent, but between continents.

## THE DISUNITY OF EUROPE

The many tides of invasion and empire-building that have swept over Europe through the centuries have left traces comparable to those of geological convulsions. That continent, from which stem some of the world's greatest civilizations, has itself failed to achieve political, economic or cultural unity. It continues to be torn by bloody struggles between its various peoples, all of whom live in different periods of history, and belong, as it were, to different geological formations. Before 1939, France, Britain, the Low Countries and the Scandinavian states had achieved a high level of development. They were living in the twentieth century. In these countries flourished the economic system we call capitalism—a system that encouraged the investment, on private initiative, of private

capital in all forms of enterprise for private profit. There parliamentary institutions were functioning more or less effectively, the rights of minorities were respected, a spirit of humanitarian concern for social welfare tempered the rigors of the Industrial Revolution. Growing prosperity seemed to justify the widespread belief in unlimited material progress. And France and Britain, having acquired colonial empires overseas, were prepared to settle down in peace to enjoyment of the good life as they understood it.

Germany, too, had passed through the Industrial Revolution. But for a variety of reasons, some geographical, some historical, the Germans had failed to achieve national unity, as the French and the British had done in earlier centuries. They had remained outside the main stream of the social and political changes precipitated by the French Revolution. So while Germany had the outward appearance of a modern state, and proved more adept at modern techniques of industry and war than France and Britain, she really belonged to a different geological formation from that of Western Europe. Politically, she was still living in the sixteenth century. Many historians believe that the maladjustment shown by Germany since the middle of the nineteenth century can be explained in large part by her failure to share in the developments that have formed the Western European tradition. Further east, Russia and the Balkans are only now telescoping into a few years the results of the Industrial Revolution as well as the social and political convulsions of the past two centuries.

There is reason to doubt that Europe can achieve stability and peace until all the peoples who inhabit it have shared a common experience. The main question today is whether the process of unifying Europe will have to be carried out by force, through the imposition of the Nazi pattern on the whole continent, or can be developed by peaceful means, on a pattern set by the Western world.

## EARLY ATTEMPTS AT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Attempts to unify Europe, and then link a unified Europe with the rest of the world, go back to the beginnings of history. For a time it looked as if the Roman Empire might achieve unification of Europe; then the Holy Roman Empire in the Middle Ages unsuccessfully sought to accomplish this task. Napoleon, early in the nineteenth century, almost succeeded in imposing on the continent both his military rule and the ideas of the French Revolution, but was finally defeated by England, Prussia, Austria and Russia combined.

The First World War, which threatened to destroy all civilization, gave a powerful impetus to the search for new forms of international organization that might assure peace and restore economic stability. The ideas advocated during that war by President Wilson, General Smuts, Lord Phillimore and other leaders were embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was made an integral part of the peace treaties of 1919. This Covenant provided for the creation of a League of Nations, with a council, an assembly, and a permanent secretariat, which were to represent countries of all continents; the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice; and a system of mandates, under League supervision, for the administration of former German and Turkish territories assigned to the Allied powers.

Unlike the various plans for peace that had preceded it, the League Covenant provided for a universal—no longer only a European—organization of states. It was to deal with the political and economic problems of the world, not merely of a continent. The League of Nations was launched in the midst of great expectations that it might remove or remedy the causes of war. It is important for us who may be called on to take part in new efforts at world reconstruction to discover why the Versailles settlement failed to bring about peace during the twenty years now described as the "Long Armistice."

## II. Why Versailles Failed

Many books and articles have been written to explain why the Versailles settlement failed to keep the peace even for the brief span of twenty years. Many more will be written in the future. Some say that the peacemakers of Versailles failed because they were too harsh toward Germany. Others say that Germany was treated too gently, and should have been ground down to extinction. Some argue that the creation of a number of small national states in Eastern Europe and the Balkans on the ruins of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires broke up the continent into unworkable fragments, which could achieve neither security nor economic stability. Many point out that it was a crucial mistake to link peace treaties which, in many instances, looked toward restoration of pre-1914 conditions with a League Covenant which looked toward the building of a new world.

If some fundamental points are to be picked out of this welter of criticisms of the Versailles settlement, it might perhaps be said that its breakdown was due chiefly to four causes: (1) an attitude of irresponsibility on the part of the victors; (2) a desire for revenge on the part of the vanquished; (3) the failure of all concerned to adapt national and international political institutions to profoundly altered economic and social conditions; and (4) the growing feeling of unease created throughout the world by the disappearance of old values, which had not yet been replaced by new values of universal validity.

### THE IRRESPONSIBLES

Public opinion in Britain and the United States, after 1919, paid lip-service to international collaboration; but, on the whole, the victors were reluctant to accept the political, military and economic obligations imposed by membership in a



world organization like the League of Nations. What they wanted most, after four years of grueling and devastating war, was to return to "normalcy" and "business as usual." Once Germany had been defeated, and the balance of power on the continent restored, the British turned back, as they had done again and again following continental victories, to the multifarious tasks of their far-flung Empire. The United States, having rejected membership in the League of Nations, sought to resume a policy which combined political isolation with efforts to promote foreign trade.

This country might have successfully practiced such a policy—as it had done in the early years of its history—if the peacemakers of Versailles had been able to restore the pre-1914 world. But the old economic order, with its relatively free trade and its more or less automatically operating gold system, was not restored. And we must always bear in mind that the whole elaborate structure of the 1919 peace treaties and the League Covenant was founded on the assumption that Britain and America would be responsible for Europe's political security. Their withdrawal immediately following the war, without waiting to see how the Versailles settlement would work, contributed in very large measure to post-war turmoil on the continent, and greatly weakened the force of the "moral" exhortations they subsequently addressed to continental countries.

#### PEACE DEMANDS SACRIFICES NO LESS THAN WAR

No one would seek to minimize Hitler's responsibility for the Second World War. Yet we must recognize that all of the participants in Europe's post-war drama were in some degree responsible for what happened during the "Long Armistice." The question is often asked whether peace could have been preserved in Europe and Asia. The answer is: yes, peace *might* have been preserved if France, Britain and the United States

had done one of two things. Either they should have been ready to make, by peaceful means, the territorial, economic, and financial adjustments demanded by Germany, Italy and Japan—in other words, have been prepared to make sacrifices for peace; or else they should have armed themselves to the teeth, and by force have resisted the demands of Germany, Italy and Japan—in other words, have been prepared to make sacrifices for war. Actually the Western powers were reluctant to sacrifice either for peace or for war. They thought peace could be picked up at bargain-counters, without any expenditure on their part, and that Hitler could be bluffed out of going to war. They thus drifted, physically and mentally unprepared, into a war for which Germany had been preparing not only since Hitler's rise to power in 1933, but since the signing of the Versailles Treaty in 1919.

### **III. A World in Ferment**

But perhaps the outstanding weakness of the Versailles settlement was that its drafters made practically no attempt to adapt national and international political institutions to social and economic conditions which had been profoundly altered by industrialization and by the war. The new wine of international collaboration was poured into the old bottles of national prejudices and economic maladjustments.

The Industrial Revolution had immensely increased the material advantages available to mankind. But it had also created a desire on the part of ever larger sections of the world's population that these material advantages be made available to all—not merely to a chosen few within national or international society. This desire brought about an ever more insistent demand for redistribution of wealth both within nations and among nations. During the French Revolution traders,

manufacturers and bankers seized power from the monarchy, the feudal aristocracy and the Church. Today, industrial and white-collar workers demand an increasing share of economic as well as political power.

### ECLIPSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The process of industrialization has speeded up the formation of larger and still larger economic units, strengthening the trend toward mass production and distribution. It has reduced the significance of the individual producer—farmer, artisan, handicraftsman. By reducing the individual to the role of a cog in a vast industrial machine, industrialization tends to undermine his spiritual significance. Large-scale and long-continued unemployment in industry and other enterprises shakes such confidence as the individual may still have in his own capacities and in the economic system under which he lives. The growth of cities destroys the sense of community responsibility and cooperation that existed in rural society, and that might in some measure restore stability to the individual. These various developments combine to create despair and defeatism among men and women who feel caught in a vise not of their own making, and abandon all hope of controlling the apparently vast and obscure forces—comparable in their minds to the forces of nature—which blindly shatter their lives. Many begin to think of people as featureless “masses,” to be pushed this way or that by “leaders,” and no longer as individuals, each with a personality and dignity of his own.

### TURNING TO DESPERATE REMEDIES

Out of such despair and defeatism have grown movements like Nazism and Communism. Both appeal to the desire of human beings for some measure of material security, now that the sense of spiritual security created by religious faith and submission to established authority has been lost or weakened.

Both promise men freedom from responsibility, which is to be assumed by a self-appointed élite—a “master class” or a “master race.” In contrast to the ideas popularized by the French Revolution, which proclaimed the liberty, equality and fraternity of all men, the Nazi revolution is based on belief in the permanent inequality and subjection of all men and nations, except the Germans. (But even the Germans must blindly obey their Führer.) And the Communist revolution, whose ultimate objectives are international in scope, is based on the belief that the workers alone are worthy to exercise power.

The totalitarian states, in other words, accept the economic and social results of the Industrial Revolution at their face value. They duplicate, in the realm of politics, the eclipse of the individual effected by industrialization. Where democracy, so far, has proved open to the criticisms of both its friends and its enemies is that it has been slow to adapt its political institutions, by democratic means, to the economic and social changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution.

By challenging the basic assumptions of democracy, Nazism and Communism have forced its reconsideration literally at the point of a gun. The whirlpool of the war that broke out in September 1939 sucked in all the revolutionary elements that had kept Europe in ferment since the overthrow of the French monarchy in 1789. The outcome of the war will, in turn, determine the form that these revolutionary elements may take in the future.



## IV. The New Democratic Revolution

Into this war Hitler threw the total resources of the German nation. He waged war by arms and by propaganda. He combined the strategy of terror with promises of peace and collaboration in his "new order" to those who would surrender on his terms. His European campaigns, carefully prepared in advance, were systematically carried out from one objective to the next. Yet Nazi victories—and this was realized by the Germans themselves—were bound to prove hollow unless Hitler could capitalize on them by bringing about restoration of peace, which alone would permit construction of his "new order." But again and again peace eluded Hitler. The more victories he won, the further the Germans seemed from achieving peace.

For in spite of their victories, their army, the terroristic methods of their *Gestapo*, and their efforts to preserve a "correct" attitude, the Nazis found it increasingly difficult to win the support of the occupied countries—least of all countries like Norway and Holland which Hitler had regarded as naturally predestined for voluntary participation in his "new order." Throughout the length and breadth of Europe, from Brittany to Greece, people of high and low degree, princes and paupers, intellectuals and schoolboys, soldiers and pacifists, without visible leadership or organization, as if bound by some secret password, resorted spontaneously to the same measures of passive resistance against the Nazis. The struggle abandoned by the armed forces was taken up by unarmed civilians. The sacrifices in terms of life and property that the peoples of Europe had been reluctant to make in time of peace to avert or win the war, they seemed ready—in fact, eager—to make for the sake of preventing consummation of Nazi "peace." In their resistance to the Nazis the Europeans seemed on the point of forging that common experience which might serve

as the basis for ultimate unification of the continent—just as China has been unified by her struggle against Japan.

### V FOR VICTORY

In the summer of 1941 the "V for Victory" sprang up everywhere overnight—in two spread fingers held up as a salute, chalked up on walls and cars, as the first bars of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony played by orchestras or whistled by newsboys, tapped out in Morse code on coffee-house tables. The wave of a new revolt swept over Europe—a revolt for liberty at the cost of life itself. Europe, which only yesterday had seemed blighted beyond recovery, suddenly flowered again with the courage and faith of its unknown civilian heroes. The people again emerged as individuals from the featureless "masses."

It was this revolt against Nazism, not Nazism itself, that held the promise of a new order, the seeds of post-war reconstruction. But it was in no sense a revolt in favor of returning to the old regime. Those who rebelled against the Nazis did not demand restoration of parliamentary institutions, which before 1939 had been gradually undermined and distorted by party conflicts and personal ambitions. They did not insist on resurrection of the economic system destroyed by the Nazis, which too often had failed to assure a decent standard of living to underprivileged people, especially in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. They did not seek to recapture that spirit of cynicism and fatigue which had become associated after the First World War with the "lost generation." On the contrary, they demanded reconstruction of the political and economic order in Europe and in the world on such a basis as to promote the welfare of the common man and to prevent the recurrence of catastrophic wars. They proclaimed a faith of their own—a faith in the dignity and the integrity of the individual, the rights of minorities, freedom from arbitrary violence, freedom

to think, freedom to believe. The new revolution in Europe thus reaffirmed the original concepts of democracy; but it also demanded that these concepts should be immediately translated into practical terms.

### THE TRANSFORMATION OF BRITAIN

This continental revolution was akin in spirit to the transformation undergone by the British after Dunkirk. For while Dunkirk had seemed a military defeat, the little men and women of Britain transmuted it into a psychological victory. Once roused from their lethargy, the British displayed indomitable endurance in the face of destructive German air raids. By a supreme feat of rationalization they insisted that practically every one of the results of these raids was a blessing in disguise. The evacuation of city children to the country, they said, provided a much needed opportunity to break down class distinctions. The destruction of homes in overcrowded slums offered architects an undreamed-of chance to carry out modern ideas of housing and city planning. The need to ration food made it possible to institute long overdue reforms in the diet of the average Britisher. In this mortal crisis, some of the characteristics that foreigners had often found distressing—such as lack of imagination, deficiency in organization, hard-headed stubbornness—stood the British in good stead. A nation traditionally regarded as a nation of shopkeepers suddenly showed a magnificent disregard for material possessions.

And while the peoples of Europe and Britain were revolting against both the Nazis and the Western betrayal of democracy in national affairs, the peoples of Asia were revolting against both Japan and the Western betrayal of democracy in international affairs.

## V. In Search of a New Order

The revolutionary spirit of resistance to Germany and Japan made it essential for the Western powers to embody this spirit in their own program for a post-war order. Before, and even during the war, Nazi propagandists had skilfully used the world's revolutionary ferment as a weapon against what they called the "plutodemocracies." In 1941, Britain and the United States were in a position to wrest this weapon from the Nazis, and to use the new revolution as a lever for the overthrow of Hitler. But the real task still lay ahead—the task of defining the democratic concept of the post-war order in such a way as to convince people throughout the world that a victory of the Western powers would be, not the closing act of the drama, but the curtain raiser for a period of expanded and reinvigorated democracy.

For everywhere men and women are searching for a new order. They are like people whose house has burned down, and who look among the ruins for things they may salvage in building their new home. What is worth saving? What must be scrapped because it no longer fits new surroundings? Life must go on. But it may have to go on among new furnishings. In the harsh light of world conflagration, people begin to distinguish between what is absolutely necessary for community existence, and what can be dispensed with.

### THE SHADOW AND THE SUBSTANCE

In building for the future, it is essential to distinguish between the things that can, and indeed must, be recovered from the world conflagration, and those whose restoration is either doubtful or downright undesirable. It is doubtful, for example, that *laissez-faire* capitalism could be restored after the war. In fact, it may be distinctly undesirable, immediately on cessation of hostilities, to relax the innumerable controls imposed



by both democracies and dictatorships which have become embedded in the fabric of the world's economic life.

It would be disastrous if Europe, after the war, should return to the kind of acute nationalism that inspired the policy of some Eastern European states toward Germany in the post-1919 period, and the still more fanatical nationalism of the Nazis toward the Poles and the Czechs. It would be disappointing to find that the war had failed to make any dent on the concept of national sovereignty, which in the past has proved a stumbling block to effective political and economic collaboration. It would be surprising, when the "cease fire!" sounds, if Britain should still command the world influence she enjoyed as late as 1939; if France could recapture any semblance of the leadership she once exercised on the European continent; if Russia could again be ostracized by the community of nations; if Germany could once more be even temporarily reduced to the status of a second-rate nation. It seems difficult to believe that, in the period after the war, it would be possible for many countries to resume a policy of neutrality. It appears highly improbable that Communism will still be regarded as a universal panacea against war and imperialism. But it is equally improbable that, even if Hitler is overthrown, Nazism will have failed to have left a deep and lasting imprint on European life.

Yet much as some people may regret the passing of *laissez-faire* capitalism, or fanatical nationalism, or traditional neutrality, or national sovereignty, or blind faith in Communism and Nazism, all these may prove to have been so many shadows. The substance that needs to be recovered from the world conflagration for post-war reconstruction must be sought not merely in terms of politics or economics, but in terms of the basic needs of the human being. These are needs not only of the body, but also of the mind and of the spirit.

The outstanding contribution of both Christianity and

democracy as originally conceived has been their common assumption that man lives not by bread alone, and is concerned not only with his own selfish purposes, but with the general welfare. These concepts have been obscured again and again by emphasis on the importance of material gains with little or no reference to their moral or spiritual value—thus leading to worship of sheer power, which finds its culmination today in submission to the dictates of the totalitarian state. At a moment when the destiny of mankind hangs in the balance, it is not enough for the democratic peoples to repudiate the materialistic concept of life. This would be a negative action, a sort of spiritual Maginot Line. What is needed to meet the challenge of totalitarianism is to reaffirm the highest concepts of religious faith and democracy, and to embody them in concrete political and economic action.

#### TOWARD A CONTRIBUTIVE SOCIETY

But if man does not live by bread alone, he must have a minimum subsistence for himself and his dependents before he can function on a spiritual plane. Democratic institutions and tolerance for conflicting views have prospered best in societies which had achieved a relatively high level of economic development, and where some effort had been made to improve the living standard of the masses. But even when the individual has been freed from grinding economic necessity, he will not make an effective contribution to democratic life if he acts entirely in terms of his own freedom to do what he pleases. Freedom, carried beyond certain limits, may infringe on the interests of the community as a whole.

The majority of human beings function most effectively as active participants in communal life, rather than as isolated atoms concerned primarily with their own pursuits. Such integration of the individual and the community does not necessarily mean regimented participation in tasks arbitrarily

assigned from above and imposed through force. What it should mean is voluntary collaboration by all members of the community, according to their ability, in tasks freely discussed in advance, and undertaken by consent of the majority, with due consideration for the rights of minorities. Between the two extremes of untrammelled individual initiative and untrammelled state action lies a vast middle ground for fruitful cooperative living, both on the national and on the international plane. But to achieve such living, however imperfectly, we need to develop a new philosophy of life.

This philosophy would have to take as its starting point the assumption that we are now passing from the stage of what the British economist Tawney has described as the "acquisitive society," in which men and nations were concerned primarily with what they could acquire for themselves, to the stage of what has been described as the "contributive society," in which men and nations would be concerned primarily with what they can contribute to communal life. This contributive society cannot be conceived of as an Utopia to be built overnight. Its blueprints must be governed by the limits of practical action.

## **VI. The Limits of Practical Action**

In most discussions of post-war reconstruction, there is a tendency to assume that what we need, above all, is a complete blueprint of the new world order. Yet no intelligent architect would undertake to draw up a blueprint of a building without thorough study of land and climate, as well as the living needs and economic limitations of the people who are to occupy the house.

Similar considerations must be borne in mind when we discuss post-war reconstruction. There are many possibilities of

altering the attitude of people to one another, both within and between nations, by education, improvement in the standard of living, a greater feeling of security, wider opportunities for leisure. But these possibilities must be considered within the framework of certain practical factors, which must form an intrinsic part of any settlement—whether this settlement results from a stalemate, an Allied victory over Germany, or a Nazi victory. Let us look at some of these factors in Europe and other continents.

### GEOGRAPHIC IMPERATIVES

Of these factors, the most fundamental and least capable of alteration is geography. A great deal is always being said about the effects of ideology or economics on the foreign policies of powers, great and small. But in the course of history many ideologies have come and gone, many economic needs have been expressed, fulfilled and then again repressed—yet the foreign policies of various national states have shown strikingly little change. This is due, above all, to the difficulty of escaping from the limitations imposed by the geographic pattern. This pattern may be broken by invasions and conquests. It may be narrowed by vast improvements in transportation and communication, as we see in the case of air raids on England. But it cannot be physically destroyed, and must be borne in mind by all builders of a new order.

### GERMANY—A COUNTRY WITHOUT NATURAL FRONTIERS

Germany, for example, remains bound by the fact that the German people settled in a central region of Europe which has no natural frontiers. The land occupied by the German-speaking peoples is delimited on the west by the Rhine, on the east by the Danube, but otherwise it lacks natural defenses such as Italy possesses in the Alps, France in the Pyrenees, Britain in her control of the seas. This central region, in



turn, has no unifying geographic pattern. To this situation may be traced two of the principal difficulties experienced by the German people—lack of unity, and fear of encirclement which, through war, might lead to the break-up of the German nation. To outside observers this fear of encirclement may

appear either as a figment of the imagination, or as an attempt to justify German expansion. While both assumptions may be correct, the very fact that this fear has troubled so many Germans makes it necessary for us to take it into serious consideration.

Because of her geographic position, Germany seeks domination of Eastern Europe, to satisfy both her desire for security and her economic needs. Germany also wants an unobstructed outlet to the high seas, which until now could be blocked by Britain's command of the English Channel and the Atlantic Ocean. The potential conflict between British sea power and German land power has caused Germany, since her unification in 1870, to seek the support of all who may have an axe to grind against the British Empire—be it Italy, Russia, Japan, or malcontents in India and other British possessions.

#### BRITAIN—BALANCE WHEEL OF A CONTINENT

Britain's foreign policy, too, is profoundly affected by geography. The British Isles are vulnerable to attack from the continent—and this is not due merely to the development of air warfare, since Britain was invaded by Normans, Vikings and others in the days of sailing ships. Nor are the British Isles suf-



ficiently rich in foodstuffs and raw materials needed by industry to adopt a policy of self-sufficiency such as that preached by the Nazis. To an even greater degree than the Reich, Britain depends on imports from abroad, especially from her Dominions and overseas colonies. Britain must therefore achieve two objectives: maintain relative peace and stability on the continent, in the hope of preventing a conflict which might threaten her island security; and keep sea routes open for the transportation of supplies all over the world.

These two objectives have been expressed in the basic concepts of British foreign policy: "balance of power" on the continent, and "freedom of the seas." Britain, even more than the United States, would like to remain isolated from conflicts on the European continent; but her geography prevents her from maintaining, except intermittently, that "splendid isolation" which was once her ideal. Consequently British policy combines a desire for political isolation with the practical need to intervene in all parts of the world where British interests might conceivably be affected. This essential contradiction—duplicated on a larger scale by the United States—is one of the principal reasons why continental countries describe Britain as "hypocritical" and "perfidious."

The desire to maintain a balance of power on the continent causes Britain to oppose any country in Europe which appears headed for a dominant role, irrespective of the feelings the British may otherwise have for the people concerned. When France was the leading power in Europe, Britain fought to prevent supremacy by Louis XIV and Napoleon, and in these struggles enlisted the assistance of other peoples—Germans, Russians, Spaniards. When, after her defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, France declined in political power and Germany forged to the front, Britain similarly opposed German domination of Southeastern Europe (as well as her efforts to achieve naval and colonial power), and in this struggle

joined forces with France, Russia and Japan, and later with Italy and the United States.

More complex is Britain's attitude toward Russia, which she has regarded as a potential competitor for domination of the Near and Middle East, and for influence in the Far East. This attitude, again, is not due purely to ideological considerations provoked by Communism. It existed also before 1914, when British liberals opposed an alliance with Russia on the ground that a democratic state like Britain should not be allied with a reactionary monarchy like that of the Tsars. Britain's chief worry then, as now, was that Russia might attempt to control the Straits, and obtain spheres of influence in Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq, thus reaching the borders of India. What was once fear of Tsarism became after 1919 fear of Communism. Against the possibility of Soviet expansion eastward Britain, before 1914, tried to throw up a geographic bulwark by her alliance with Japan, concluded in 1902, two years before the Russo-Japanese war started. Quite recently, when Japan was challenging the interests of the Western powers in China, an influential group of British Conservatives still hoped to obtain Tokyo's support in blocking further advance by the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, the need of keeping sea routes open and maintaining access to the manpower and raw materials of the Dominions and overseas colonies makes it necessary for Britain to follow a foreign policy which will command the un-



divided support of the Dominions. This means that it is difficult for Britain to adopt a purely European policy, which would have as little immediate attraction for Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa as a purely European policy would have for the United States. Britain must thus straddle two worlds and this, again, gives an indecisive and seemingly hypocritical character to her actions in foreign affairs.


### FRANCE'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY

Like Britain, France is a colonial as well as a European power. But, unlike Britain, France, because of her geographical position, is part of the continent, and therefore has no choice but to face the problems thrust upon her by her close proximity to other European peoples.

France's influence on the European continent has probably been more far-reaching than that of any other national group in modern history. It has been due not to economic domination—since France, with her well-balanced economy, offers a relatively restricted market for the farm or factory products of other countries. It has been due chiefly to her military

power, and the magnetic attraction of her culture, which has drawn to Paris the most diverse people from far-flung corners of the world.

As France's military power appeared to dwindle after her defeat at Sedan in 1870, and the establishment of the Third Republic, French policy underwent a profound change.



Instead of seeking to achieve political and military leadership on the continent—as she had been from Charlemagne to Napoleon—France sought to maintain her own security against possible threats by the newly founded German Empire. In her efforts to avert these threats, she developed close relations with all countries east of Germany, irrespective of their internal systems: first, by her alliance with Russia in 1891, which in 1907 was geared into the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale; then, after 1919, when Communist Russia no longer seemed a safe ally, by forming military alliances with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia; and, after Hitler's rise to power and Germany's resumption of her "drive to the east," by concluding a pact of mutual assistance with the U. S. S. R. and facilitating Moscow's entrance into the League of Nations.

France's security problem, created by her geographic position, will always mean that she must either receive strong guarantees of her security against German invasion from the other Western powers, first and foremost Britain (which Britain refused to give after 1919); or preferably assurances of international assistance through a League of Nations, guaranteed by an international police force. It also means that, since France, like Britain, must maintain communications with her colonial Empire in North Africa and the Far East, she prefers to remain on friendly terms with the Mediterranean countries—Spain and Italy—which, if hostile, might menace her communications.

#### ITALY—PRISONER OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

Italy's foreign policy, too, is affected by considerations of geography. Few countries in Europe are as vulnerable to air and sea attack as Italy, with her extended coastline; and few countries are so dependent on imports of foodstuffs and raw materials. Both considerations cause Italy to seek complete control over the Mediterranean where, in a very real sense, she





feels locked in, since France and Britain command the entrances to that sea by their control of Gibraltar and Tunis at one end, Egypt (with the Suez Canal) and

the Arabian Peninsula on the other. In the past this situation has made Italy dependent to a peculiar degree on the good will of France and Britain for essential supplies and for communications with her scattered colonies in North and East Africa.

Italy's dependence on the Western powers has irked—not the Italian people as a whole, who are noticeably free from expansionist aspirations—but those Italian leaders who have cherished the personal ambition of transforming Italy into a great power and recapturing the glories of the Roman Empire. Italy's vulnerable geographic position and the meagerness of her economic resources, however, prevent a direct approach to these problems. Like many of the Italian princes of earlier ages, the Fascist government has therefore been forced to follow a highly complicated policy of delicate maneuvers intended to achieve for Italy, with as little expenditure of manpower and material as possible, a number of outwardly insignificant advantages which might eventually add up to a relatively advantageous position. The difficulty is that, as so often in the case of such maneuvers, every advantage obtained has been counterbalanced by an often more serious disadvantage. Thus Italy undoubtedly improved her bargaining position with respect to Britain and France by forming the Rome-Berlin axis and joining the anti-Comintern pact. But she simultaneously gave Germany a degree of influence over her foreign policy which may prove disastrous for Italy in the long run.

## RUSSIA—A BRIDGE BETWEEN CONTINENTS

Russia's foreign policy, again, is determined not solely by ideological considerations, but by her geographic position. No matter what may have been the conflicting philosophies of the Tsars, Lenin and Stalin, Russian leaders cannot escape the fact that they rule a vast country of continental expanse. Although richly endowed with natural resources, this country has as yet been barely developed, is poor in industrial skill and transportation facilities, and almost wholly lacking in political experience. To add to her difficulties, she spans Europe and Asia, and is in the paradoxical position of being periodically disavowed by both civilizations. She must therefore always strive to preserve a precarious balance of power between the two continents which she straddles, and from which she anticipates concerted attacks. Russia's problems are further complicated by the fact that her economic value, both as an undeveloped market for manufactured goods and as a source of foodstuffs and raw materials for advanced industrial countries, is a constant temptation to her neighbors of West and East, who hope to find in Russia the "living space" formerly open to new settlers in Africa, Asia and the Americas.



Russia is a landlocked continent; and her historic drive has been to escape from this dilemma—by spreading eastward to the Pacific Ocean in a vast pioneering expansion comparable to the westward expansion of the United States, and in the west, by seeking control of the exits to the Baltic and the Black Seas. In her eastward expansion, Russia came into conflict with Japan and, in the Near and Middle East, with Britain; while in her westward expansion she fought at various times Poles, Swedes, Turks and Germans, and more recently Finns. Her chief political problem, in her relations with the Western world, is that the Western powers have tended to regard her as an Asiatic country, to be kept at a safe distance from European affairs, and preferably excluded altogether; while Japan has similarly tried to exclude her from Asiatic affairs.

For her part, Russia has always associated her territorial expansion with a messianic mission of universal dimensions. In the days of the Tsars this mission took the form of Pan-Slavism, which brought under Russian influence the Slav peoples of the Balkans—Serbs and Bulgarians—whom Russia had helped when they were throwing off the yoke of the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century. In the days of Lenin and Stalin this mission took the form of an attempt to unite the workers of all the world under the banners of Communism in a crusade against the “imperialist capitalism” of Britain, France, Germany and the United States—a crusade which was concentrated against Nazism after Germany’s invasion of Russia in 1941.

## VII. Where Nations End and Minorities Begin

If geography creates many problems in international relations, even greater problems arise when geography becomes confused with politics, as in the case of national minorities. In contrast to Western Europe, where national groups are relatively homogeneous, Eastern Europe has been swept by so many migrations, from east to west and west to east, that it becomes increasingly difficult to fix the line at which nations end and minorities begin. Nothing has so effectively played into Hitler's hands as the conflicts which have raged in the Succession States since 1919: between Poles, Ukrainians, Germans in Poland; between Germans, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians and Ruthenians in Czechoslovakia; between Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia. These conflicts between national groups have now been so overlaid with religious, cultural, economic and other grievances that even the most idealistic reformer would find it difficult to discover a guiding principle for their reconciliation.

To this problem many approaches have been made, in each case with but meagre success. National groups which had achieved a considerable measure of independence in the Middle Ages have been split among great powers, like the Poles, or absorbed into the Austro-Hungarian empire, like the Czechs; yet successive drastic attempts at Germanization, Russification or Magyarization failed to obliterate their national characteristics or destroy their desire for independence. When the First World War released many of these national groups from their ties to the empires of the Hohenzollerns, the Hapsburgs and the Romanovs, they hastened to reconstruct national states, into which they in turn absorbed alien peoples, not on grounds of nationality, but because of economic or strategic considerations. The struggle waged by the various national groups within the Austro-Hungarian Empire was thus duplicated, on a smaller



but fiercer scale, in each one of the Succession States. This struggle, in each case, was embittered by the economic break-up of the Empire, and by the fact that the German inhabitants of that empire, who had always considered themselves superior to the Slavs, had now become minorities in predominantly Slav states. The rise of another generation, more free than the founders of the new states from the resentments and prejudices of pre-1914 days, might have removed some of the most crying grievances. But no time was given for this.


### SELF-DETERMINATION VS. THE MASTER RACE

The Paris Peace Conference had adopted "self-determination of nations" as the yardstick in the adjustment of nationality problems. The Nazis claimed that in Eastern Europe "self-determination" worked to the advantage of "inferior" peoples, at the expense of the German "master race." Their formula provides for self-determination only in the case of Germans inhabiting an indeterminate region east of the Reich that Hitler regards as Germany's natural "living space." Non-Germans are to accept the political and economic lot determined for them by the Nazis. The Nazi formula presupposes—and events in Czechoslovakia and Poland indicate that this is not exaggerated—that the Nazis will systematically seek to denationalize non-Germans under their control. The methods used to achieve this objective range from wholesale transfers of population (with severance of family ties and deliberate attempts to reduce the reproduction of Slavs), to extermination of intellectual leaders and suppression of national language schools. Whether these methods will succeed where earlier attempts at Germanization failed, or will merely provoke even more violent national explosions than those which marked the end of the Hapsburg Empire it is as yet too early to say. Nor does the German method of transplanting populations—quite aside from the suffering thus inflicted on individuals—offer a solution of the

national minorities problems in Eastern Europe; since to satisfy each group claiming national independence, no matter how small, it would be necessary to transform all of that region into a migratory caravan constantly on the march.

### ARE BOUNDARIES IMPORTANT?

The most helpful approach that can be made to the problem of national minorities is to reduce as much as possible the importance of national boundaries. Obviously, this can be done only if good will exists on all sides. Germany's attempt to transplant populations, crude and brutal as it is, may at least help to break down the concept of the sacredness of national frontiers. National minority problems cannot even be



\*This figure includes minority population of both European and Asiatic autonomous states of the U.S.S.R.

discussed, let alone solved, in terms of national boundaries, which they transcend in practically every instance.

Nor does attachment to national boundaries constitute the most serious aspect of the minority question. The very fact that minorities, in many cases, have not all been reunited within one national state has forced them to try other methods of maintaining their national character. Frequently to them the most important thing is not this or that boundary, but freedom, under the law, to maintain their own language, religion, customs, cultural patterns. What is most needed in Eastern Europe is a period of transition in the course of which strong, but not rabidly nationalistic, governments could gradually educate the diverse groups within the region to learn the use of the freedoms they would be assured under internationally guaranteed treaties—and to learn, too, that freedom can never be divorced from responsibility. As long as Germany retains a philosophy which denies equality and minimum human rights even to Germans, let alone non-Germans, it would be difficult to develop such a policy in collaboration with the Reich. But if and when the Germans are ready to admit that diversity need not necessarily imply disunity, they may see a real advantage for themselves in a transitional system that might gradually reduce frictions between national minorities.

#### WAXING AND WANING NATIONALISM

On the eve of the Second World War it seemed that nationalism might be on the wane, at least in the more advanced states of Western and Northern Europe, which had achieved national unity early in their history. At its zenith in the nineteenth century, nationalism had proved a great releasing force. The period of national revolutions in Europe, South America, and other regions, when new nations broke away from the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Spanish empires, was a time of joyful and fruitful ferment of ideas and emotions that over-

flowed in national sagas, national music, national painting. Today the world is drinking the dregs of that heady wine in the fanatical and perverted nationalism which developed after the First World War. Terrible as it may be to contemplate, after this war we must be prepared to witness a recrudescence of nationalism in its harshest form, even in the countries of Western and Northern Europe which appeared to have outgrown it. If Hitler is defeated, it must be expected that the conquered peoples, rising in revolt against their Nazi oppressors, will in turn resort to drastic measures. One of the most difficult tasks to be faced during the period of receivership will be that of preventing wholesale slaughter both of Nazis and of native Quislings within each of the occupied countries. At that time, the Europeans will have much to learn from the experience of the Soviet Union, where a considerable measure of cultural autonomy for Russia's 150 races and nationalities existed side by side with an extreme form of political and economic centralization. They will have even more to learn from the experience of those Europeans who emigrated to the New World, and who in both North and South America have succeeded in achieving political unity and economic progress in an atmosphere of tolerance for religious, racial and other minorities.



## VIII. Can Politics Plus Economics Equal Peace?

Difficult as it is to change geographic factors and to settle national minority problems, it is also not always easy to adjust economic factors in international relations. Critics of the Versailles settlement have said that the peacemakers of 1919 paid too much attention to political questions, and not enough to those concerned with economics. The next peace conference, they believe, must add economics to politics if it is to achieve a lasting settlement. But can politics plus economics equal peace, unless there is first a change in the philosophy of life of the various nations?

In discussions regarding economic problems it is often assumed that some countries are "have" nations because they can draw on the resources of overseas colonies, as compared with "have-not" nations like Germany, Italy and Japan, which have few or no colonies; that the problems of the have-nots could easily be remedied by redistribution of territories and raw materials; and that the standard of living in have countries is higher than in the have-nots.

### WHAT ARE HAVE-NOT COUNTRIES?

Even a brief analysis of international economic problems reveals the complete or partial fallacy of these assumptions. The first thing to remember is that, no matter what we do, we cannot change the fact that natural resources are unevenly distributed over the earth's surface. No country—not even Russia and the United States—has all the foodstuffs and industrial raw materials it may need within its own borders. As we have seen, Britain, in time of war, can be an even poorer have-not country than Germany. For her imports of foodstuffs and raw materials Britain depends not only on the Dominions and on British colonies, but on other regions of the world, notably the United States and Latin America. In purchasing products

# WORLD COLONIAL AREAS (AS OF 1939)



## DISTRIBUTION AMONG CHIEF COLONIAL POWERS

### BY AREAS (IN 1,000 SQUARE MILES)

GREAT BRITAIN and DOMINIONS	FRANCE	ITALY	BEL.	PORT.	NETH.	JAP.	U.S.
5,682	4,300	1,400	940	810	790	576	119

### BY POPULATION (IN MILLIONS)

GREAT BRITAIN and DOMINIONS	FRANCE	IT.	BEL.	PORT.	NETH.	JAPAN	U.S.
499	65	10	13	9.2	66	59	18

from the Dominions—over which she has no political control—Britain, like Germany or any other country, must pay either in cash or goods. True, Britain derives certain advantages from preferential arrangements with the Dominions, such as the Ottawa treaties of 1932, which marked a departure from her traditional policy of free trade; and through political control of non-self-governing colonies—as distinguished from the self-governing Dominions—Britain can dominate their markets and


direct their imports. To this extent, there is an argument to be made on behalf of Germany, Italy and Japan.

It is difficult to see, however, how this situation could be improved by mere redistribution of territories—that is, by transferring British or French colonies to Germany, Italy and Japan, who would then (as indicated by Nazi plans for the future) attempt to establish in these colonies an even more tightly closed economy than that against which they have been protesting. What we need is not transfer of colonial territories from one power to another, but equal access by all countries to the markets and raw materials of colonial territories. In other words, if France, Britain and other colonial powers—Holland, Belgium and Portugal—should abandon their preferential arrangements and maintain the “open door” in their colonies, as some of them have been obliged to do in territories assigned to them as mandates by the League of Nations in 1919, Germany, Italy and Japan could enjoy free access to colonial markets and raw materials on the same terms as the colony-owning powers.

### THE QUESTIONS OF PRESTIGE AND POWER

The problem of markets and raw materials, however, is not purely one of economics. It is to a much greater extent a problem of prestige and strategy. Germany, Italy and Japan have been protesting against the pre-war system not only because they found it difficult to sell and buy in French, British and other colonies, but because they wanted political control of colonial territories, both to enhance their power and to protect themselves against the risk that they might be barred from sources of essential supplies in case of war. Their anxiety can be understood when we remember that advanced industrial countries need a great variety of raw materials from all over the world for the development of their industries, especially when they are engaged in the production of war equipment.

Economic questions are thus inextricably interwoven with political questions. For if nations were not constantly living either in anticipation of war, or in prosecution of war, they would not be so worried by the possibility of being cut off from markets and raw materials in wartime. As long as power—especially military power—remains a determining factor in relations between nations, there is bound to be a struggle to obtain every scrap that can enhance a nation's material strength and prestige.



What is true of raw materials is also true of the moot question of surplus populations. We know that Germany, Italy and Japan have been demanding colonies on the ground that they need outlets for surplus populations that cannot be supported at home; yet these countries have also encouraged, by every means at their command, the growth of their populations, because they wanted to have a large reservoir of manpower to draw on in case of war. If all countries were living in anticipation of peace, instead of war, they might concentrate their efforts, not on raising more children too often destined to be-



come cannon-fodder, but children who are more healthy, by using the resources now expended on war to improve their standard of living.

### STANDARD OF LIVING A TEST?

The standard of living of any given country is by no means in direct ratio to the territory under its control or the amount of raw materials at its disposal. The standard of living of the German people, for example, may differ in some respects from that of the British. But from the point of view of social welfare, health, physical recreation and housing, Germany's peacetime standard of living compared favorably with that of the British. And no great power in Europe—not France, or Britain, or Italy, or Germany, or Russia—had achieved before 1939 such a high standard of living, both material and moral, as the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland, which lack most of the foodstuffs and raw materials coveted by the have-not powers. If mere command of material resources were in itself sufficient to assure a high living standard, then the Soviet Union should be by far the most advanced country in Europe, which it obviously is not.

### THE FUTURE OF IMPERIALISM

So far as we can see, the poorest countries in the world are those which produce foodstuffs and raw materials, but have developed little or no industry of their own, and must therefore depend on advanced industrial countries for capital and manufactured goods. During the period when advanced industrial countries are providing capital and manufactured goods to backward areas—whether these are self-governing, or colonies of the great powers—they enjoy a relatively high standard of living, even though their economic resources may be unequally distributed among their own populations. The process by which the advanced countries have acquired influence in

backward areas, whether through political, economic or military means, is usually described as imperialism. But imperialism may turn out to be self-liquidating. For as the backward areas in turn develop industrial techniques, and learn how to manufacture their own goods, the advanced industrial countries lose markets in these areas, or are forced to alter the character of their exports. For example, the British lost their market for certain consumers' goods, notably cheap textiles, in the Far East, when Japan was able to supply textiles at lower prices than Britain because of lower labor costs. But Britain and other Western powers may find it possible for a long time to come to supply the Far East with heavy manufactured goods, such as machinery and railway equipment.

### THE BALKAN DILEMMA

This change in the economic character of imperialism is already noticeable in the Balkans, in South America, and in Asia. Before 1939, neither Britain, which imports most of her food-stuffs from overseas, nor France, which is agriculturally self-sufficient, could offer a market for the agricultural products of the Balkan countries. The interest that Britain and France had in the Balkans was determined not by economics or by concern for the welfare of these countries, but by political and strategic considerations.

Unlike France and Britain, Germany and Italy are poor in capital, and therefore decry the "plutocratic capitalism" of the Western powers, especially foreign loans and the use of gold in international transactions. The Axis countries, however, are rich in labor-power and, in the case of Germany, also in technical skill. Cutting their coat to fit their cloth, the Nazis have preached the theory that "labor," not "capital," is needed for the development of the backward agricultural countries in the Balkans and elsewhere. They claim that this "labor," in the form of manufactured goods, can be supplied by Germany in

unlimited quantities, provided the Balkan countries abandon or curtail their attempts at industrialization, and sell the bulk of their farm products and raw materials to the Reich.

Sooner or later, the countries of the Balkans and Russia must begin to approximate the level of development of Western countries, unless Europe is to remain permanently divided into watertight economic compartments. They can reach this level in one of two ways: either by effecting their own industrialization (which requires capital, or else vast natural wealth, as in the case of Russia); or by permitting advanced industrial powers, like Britain or Germany, to industrialize them in return for political or economic concessions on their part. The choice for the Balkans is between remote financial control by Britain, France and the United States, which has been often administered by unscrupulous native financiers and politicians, and has done little to enhance the prestige of democracy; or economic domination by Germany which, if past experience is a guide, would also involve direct political domination.

### SOUTH AMERICA IN TRANSITION

What is true of the Balkans is also true of South America, another region rich in foodstuffs and raw materials. For many reasons, some political, others social and economic, South America has developed more slowly than North America, and today many of the countries of that continent make one think of what the United States must have been fifty or more years ago. In a period of world-wide wars and revolutions, these countries are passing from a stage of primitive agriculture, when their raw-material resources were controlled in large part by foreign capital, to a stage when they are beginning to develop light industries, in part at least with native capital. At the same time, they are seeking to overcome widespread illiteracy; to solve the new social problems created by industrialization and the growth of cities; and to assimilate large col-

onies of immigrants from Europe and Asia, notably Germans and Japanese.

In this period of transition, some South Americans look upon Britain and the United States not as democracies, but as "imperialistic" nations that seek to exploit their resources without adequate compensation or sufficient regard for the welfare of their peoples. Yet they realize that, for the most part, their countries have not reached the level of technical development which would permit them to take over operation of mines or public utilities now operated by British or American interests, and that withdrawal of foreign capital might precipitate an economic collapse.

### IMPERIALISM IN ASIA

Many of the problems of the Balkans and South America are duplicated in China and other countries of Asia, which are still in the stage of passing from primitive agriculture to industrialization. At this stage, Japan has challenged the Western powers, from which she had learned industrial and military techniques, for control of the markets and raw materials of "Greater East Asia," which Tokyo claims as its "living space" and "co-prosperity sphere." Like Germany and Italy, Japan has no capital to export, and would find it difficult to carry out alone her projected development of Greater East Asia. But she does have a large reservoir of cheap labor, and many experts think that further industrialization would alleviate Japan's population problem—provided Japan can find a market for her manufactured products. China and other economically backward areas of Asia could absorb manufactured products for many years to come, until they, in turn, have developed their own industries. A Japanese victory in the Far East would exclude the Western powers from participation in this development. But even in case of Japanese defeat, the problem of providing remedies for Japan's economic problems, while main-

# WHERE SIX VITAL RAW

## IRON



## COPPER



## TIN



EACH DOT REPRESENTS 10%




# MATERIALS ARE FOUND

## COAL



## PETROLEUM



## RUBBER



PRODUCTION OF THE MATERIALS NAMED

taining China's political independence, would remain. And China's political independence implies that the Western powers, no less than Japan, would have to surrender the special privileges they acquired in that country during the nineteenth century, when they enjoyed industrial and military superiority over the Far East.

In the past imperialism, whatever country practiced it, has resulted from time to time in excesses and abuses which have aroused the resentment of peoples in backward areas. These peoples, in turn, have sought to end the political domination and economic exploitation of so-called advanced countries, and have meanwhile played the great powers one against the other in the hope of obtaining concessions and advantages from all.

#### WHAT KIND OF IMPERIALISM?

British, French and American imperialism, like that of other countries, has produced many ugly results. But this is not to say that Nazi imperialism, based on theories of the "master race" and racial discrimination applied to some of the most culturally advanced peoples of Europe, may not be more reprehensible than that of Britain and the United States, which in theory at least recognizes the equality of races and the rights of racial and religious minorities—even if often in the past Western practice has fallen far short of theory. The relationship known as imperialism will exist, in one form or another, as long as some peoples are economically advanced and others are economically backward.

What we need to do is not to condemn all imperialism, but to make it possible, by practical measures, for backward countries to develop as rapidly as possible, so that they can achieve economic stability and political autonomy. Nazi imperialism, which threatens to deprive weak countries, and even relatively strong ones, of industrial power, and to maintain them indefinitely at the level of colonies of the German Empire, is not

necessarily the only alternative to British and American imperialism. Another alternative is to democratize British and American imperialism, by developing "cooperation for mutual well-being" between backward and advanced peoples. A start in this direction, but only a start, has been made by the United States in Latin America, which may become a test of this country's real peace aims, just as India has become for many people a test of Britain's peace aims. In that sense, the practice of "democratic imperialism" by the Western powers in time of war may have a decisive influence on the future peace.

### THE FUTURE OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE CAPITALISM

Just as no peace conference will be able to avoid the problems created by imperialism, so it will not be able to overlook the changes wrought by industrialization and war in national, as well as international, economic systems. Undesirable as it may seem, the world has been moving away from *laissez-faire* capitalism toward one form or another of collectivism. This transition period has been characterized by a wide range of national and international controls. Such controls are by no means a monopoly of dictatorship countries. The New Deal in the United States experimented with controlled economy before 1939. Regulation of production, consumption, foreign trade, foreign exchange, and so on, which the totalitarian states had developed in an effort to free themselves from dependence on the rest of the world, and to gird their economies for war, was subsequently introduced on the outbreak of war by democratic countries, at least in modified terms and "for the duration."

These controls are rapidly altering the shape of national economic systems, and of international economy as a whole. They are imposing drastic sacrifices on all classes of the population in the name of military necessity. If these same sacrifices were exacted for the sake of social welfare—housing, health, nutrition, education, leisure activities—instead of armaments, the

world might see the realization of age-long dreams for a materially progressive society. And it is within the bounds of possibility that the various disciplines developed everywhere for purposes of war may yet be used, after the war, for purposes of building a more stable peace.

#### CONTROLS ARE HERE TO STAY?

For it is difficult to believe that these far-reaching economic regulations could be completely abandoned once war is over. It is much more likely, on the contrary, that they will be maintained, at least during the period of receivership. What we must prepare for is not immediate demobilization of economic controls and return to untrammelled private initiative, which would throw national and international economy into utter chaos, but gradual transfer of controlled war economies to the plane of peacetime activities.

In these peacetime activities, it might prove possible to evolve a system by which private initiative and enterprise would be enlisted for the fulfillment, on a national or international scale, of projects that appear socially desirable. These projects might be broadly planned by central authorities, national and international, which would be responsible to the people, but their fulfillment could be left to local or regional authorities, with the cooperation of private enterprise. It might then prove possible to organize international projects, such as public works for the development of backward areas, in which the labor and technical skill of some countries, the capital and managerial experience of others, might be effectively pooled. But in planning these projects, we must remember that today the principal objective in people's minds everywhere is the social objective. Politics plus economics may not equal peace unless future peacemakers pay some attention to the problems created by the universal demand for improvement of social welfare.

## IX. Human Welfare Enters the Equation

For whatever may be the political and economic arrangements that may be made in the course of post-war reconstruction, the one thing most of us will want to know is how these arrangements will affect our daily lives. Many peace proposals give the impression of being drafted in a vacuum. They show painstaking concern for legal and diplomatic details, but little or no concern for human beings. Tomorrow's peacemakers will be faced with a double task: the task of reconstructing the internal situation within nations, and the task of reconstructing relations between nations, both in such a way as to improve the living conditions of men, women and children. The two tasks are closely interwoven. Neither can be undertaken or accomplished alone.

The call for a new social order which would be concerned, first and foremost, with the welfare of human beings has been heard on all sides since the outbreak of the Second World War. Hitler has repeatedly contrasted the future order to be built by the Germans—where “birth matters nothing, achievement means everything”—with that of the “plutodemocracies” and their “fight for egoism, for capital, for individual and family privileges.” Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to the United States, has said that the post-war order must “bring some real security into the daily life of our humblest citizen.” Pope Pius XII, in his plea for a just peace of December 25, 1940, urged that every state insure “the proper standards of living for its own citizens of every rank,” and has decried “cold egoism” in relations between men and nations. President Roosevelt, in defining the “four essential human freedoms” on which the post-war world should be founded, mentioned “freedom from want.” This freedom, he said, “means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.”



## THE CHURCHES AND PEACE

Concern for human welfare—until recently a forgotten element in the international equation—is also reflected in a number of peace proposals, among them two important statements made by Christian groups in England. The first, *The Ten Proposals for Peace*, drawn up by the highest authorities of the Anglican, Roman Catholic and Free Churches in 1940, declared that “a peace settlement must be dictated by a sense of acute responsibility”; “that extreme inequality of wealth should be abolished”; and that “the resources of the earth should be used as God’s gift to the whole human race and used with due consideration for the present and future generations.”

The other statement, which was adopted at the Malvern Conference representing liberal Church of England clergy and laymen, held on January 7-10, 1941, supported *The Ten Proposals for Peace*, and made additional recommendations. The satisfaction of human needs, said the Malvern Conference, should be accepted as the only true end of production. No one should be deprived of support necessary for “the good life” by the fact that there is at some time no demand for his labor. The rights of labor must be recognized in principle as equal to those of capital in the control of industry, whatever the means by which this economic transformation is effected. In conclusion, the Malvern Conference declared: “The question having been propounded upon moral grounds whether a just order of society can be established so long as ownership alone is a source of income or so long as the resources necessary to our common life are privately owned, we urge that Christian people should face this question with open minds and alert consciences.”

These various statements, none of which can be described as Communist in origin, foreshadow revolutionary changes in the economic and social system during and after the war. They also indicate a realization that, while the citizen has a

responsibility toward the society in which he lives, society, in turn, has a responsibility toward the citizen, and must find ways and means of assuring him the opportunity of earning a livelihood for himself and his family. As a result, many people believe that, in the future, we should have not only a Bill of Rights within nations and among nations, but also a Bill of Responsibilities.

### THE DILEMMA OF DEMOCRACY

The Nazis have denounced the democratic countries for their failure to carry out the promises of democracy; and many people in Britain and the United States admit that the Western powers, in spite of their great wealth of economic and financial resources, have not yet assured their citizens steady employment and a minimum standard of living. We have all consequently become preoccupied with the question of what can be accomplished within nations and among nations to provide every human being with adequate nutrition, housing, education, and an opportunity for leisure activities.

To achieve this end, some people believe that we shall need far-reaching social and economic planning, both on a national and an international scale, as a corrective to pre-war anarchy. At the same time, we have to realize that, in building a planned national or international order, we shall have to give much greater authority to governments. This, in turn, increases the danger of despotism, which is just what the democratic countries dislike about Nazism and Communism. This conflict between the desire for order and the desire for freedom creates the real dilemma of democracy, which must be solved before we can develop a new democratic order in international affairs. We are confronted with the task of adapting the political institutions of democracy, which on the whole have proved effective in politically advanced and economically prosperous countries, to the economic and social needs of a mass produc-

tion era all over the world. Nor is it by any means clear that the welfare of the individual will be best promoted by a rigidly planned system, where he would remain a cog in the machine. On the contrary, it might be more effectively promoted by a more flexible system which would leave scope for individual initiative and creative action.

When we talk about the problem of demobilizing vast armies and armament plants, the question is not whether we shall find use, after the war, for the vast productive forces created during the conflict. The underfed, underclad, underhoused, undereducated peoples everywhere could absorb large surpluses of consumers' goods for years to come. The question is whether we shall be in a position to abandon production for war, and substitute production for peace. This would require gradual disarmament by all countries, and reorientation of the world's productive forces, so that our factories and farms would no longer be working primarily for war, but could be used to serve the many unsatisfied needs of human beings throughout the world.

### TOTALITARIANISM AND THE AVERAGE MAN

In approaching this task, British and American planners have one consolation. Neither Nazism nor Communism, in spite of their claims to superiority over "obsolete" democracy, have yet succeeded in providing a high standard of living for the average man under peacetime conditions. Both in Germany and in Russia, the material and spiritual needs of human beings have been consciously sacrificed for the sake of war preparations. In adapting war economies to social welfare ends, the technical difficulties may prove far less complex than the psychological difficulty of readjusting men's minds to an entirely different idea of how they can use the vast material resources placed at their disposal by industrialization and scientific discovery. The success or failure of any plans for

post-war reconstruction will, in the final analysis, depend on the psychology of the various peoples, and on their willingness, through re-education, to adapt themselves to changing conditions, and thus find a common ground on which they can build for the future.

## **X. The Psychology of Peoples**

If geographic, economic, ethnic and social factors may prove difficult to alter, it is also difficult to foresee complete transformation of the psychology of peoples. Psychological differences between peoples may be easily exaggerated, since there are obviously certain basic similarities in the reactions of all human beings to the more primitive needs, such as hunger, cold and love. But these basic similarities are overlaid by substantial differences the moment one leaves the plane of primitive reactions. These differences need not prevent understanding or even collaboration. But failure to appreciate them, and to take them into consideration in any attempt to rebuild the world, would spell the doom of such efforts from the start.

### **THE BAFFLING BRITISH**

To the average continental European, the British remain as a people what Britain is geographically—somewhat remote and shrouded in mist. The capacity of the British to be sentimental and hard-boiled, a nation of moralists but also of shopkeepers, baffles many continentals. Equally baffling is the preference of the British for understatement, their conscious effort to minimize and even condemn emotional exhibitions—so dear to the heart of Slavs and Latins. Their reluctance to make commitments in advance, or to put their obligations on paper, disturbs legalistic peoples like the French, to whom written documents appear a guarantee of security. Their very disregard

of their power, which they carry with a kind of nonchalant ease characteristic of an aristocracy, annoys more self-conscious peoples like the Germans and Italians, who crave British recognition. In this sense, the Germans and Italians would welcome violence and rage on the part of the British, which would at least indicate that the British are vulnerable to insult and menace. What bothers many Europeans is not so much that Britain is rich, but that she is complacent.

They also object to the moralizing tone often adopted by British statesmen toward other people, both because they feel Britain's assumption that her own actions have always been moral is completely untenable, and because they resent being talked to in a "governess" tone. The easy assumption of the British—characteristic in even greater degree of Americans—that highly complex international problems rooted in centuries of turbulent history can be solved overnight by simple formulas like "Union Now" or "European Federation" irks the French, who have lived so close to these very problems for years.

### THE SELF-SUFFICIENT FRENCH

The French, in turn, are not always easy for the British or other peoples to understand. The French are an intensely self-sufficient people in a cultural sense. Until very recently, when the development of physical sports and travel have tended to draw the young generation away from home, the French were probably the least traveled people in Europe, and the most difficult to pry out of their native setting. This was due principally to the fact that they could imagine nothing pleasanter than the French landscape in all its rich variety, French cooking, French wines, French culture. For the same reason, the French are not, on the whole, eager colonizers. Able French administrators have gone out to organize the French colonies, but there has been no urge for the kind of large-scale



emigration which has characterized the development of Germany, Italy, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Scandinavian countries. The French have also lost that desire for militarist expansion which was such a pronounced feature of French history until 1870. They are eager to be left at peace to cultivate those arts of living in which they have no match in Europe. From 1919 on they lived on the defensive—an attitude which made it difficult for France to take the initiative in foreign policy or risk military adventures.

This contrast between the desire of the French people to possess their soul in peace, and the position of dominance on the European continent previously associated with the name of France, lies at the root of French difficulties during the "Long Armistice." Again and again France has emerged from the position of relative comfort in which she had established herself to intervene in various parts of the continent. While her financial resources were for a time sufficient to justify these adventures, her "will to power" was not there to back them up. As a result, every time that the French were faced with the necessity of taking risks in order to defend their position—when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, when Mussolini invaded Ethiopia, when Germany demanded Sudetenland—the French preferred a compromise to the danger of war.

This duality of purpose will persist as long as the French fear the resurgence of Germany. Unlike the British, the French have no faith in peace formulas or international machinery unless these are guaranteed by written alliances and military force. Being closer to continental problems, they understand other European peoples better than the British have ever done, and cherish few illusions.

### THE UNSATISFIED GERMANS

To the French and British the Germans remain the central problem of Europe. Until this problem is solved they—and

most other Europeans—believe that no advance can be made toward any material improvement in the European situation. The Germans are not easy for non-Germans to understand. The difficulty is that they live between two worlds, and carry the virtues and weaknesses of these two worlds to extremes. The Germans belong to the West in their technical efficiency, in which they are far superior to the more conservative British and the less versatile French. But, in contrast to the British, who make even business into a sport, or the French, who regard industrialism as an unfortunate necessity, the Germans make efficiency of a military precision type the end goal of their endeavors. To achieve it they are ready to disregard all other aspects of life—especially when, as in the days of Frederick the Great, of Bismarck, and of Hitler, they are determined to achieve certain military objectives. Then culture, comfort, the pleasures of recreation, family affections are all ruthlessly sacrificed to state necessities.

But—and this is what makes Germans so confusing—they also belong to the East, with its mystical philosophies, emotional aspirations, longing for the unattainable. Here again the Germans go to extremes. Like the Russians, they devise vast formulas, dream vast dreams, encompass the universe in their longing. But unlike the Slavs, who are on the whole content with having drafted the blueprint or formulated the dream, they really expect to realize the wildest vision. They lack the sense of compromise of the British, the sense of realism of the French, the easy-going sense of humor of the Slavs. Above all, they lack that inner poise without which no individual, and no people, can perform its daily tasks in peace. They are always striving to attain the unattainable, whether in a Wagnerian mood of searching for the treasures of the Niebelungen or in the modest mood of seeking for the “little blue flower” of German romanticism.

This lack of inner poise, in turn, makes the Germans sus-

ceptible to mass emotions, mass actions, to a degree unparalleled in other countries, even among far more primitive and emotional peoples like the Slavs. The Germans seem to find it difficult to live or think alone, as individuals. They crave companionship, whether in the warm comradeship of the *Biergarten*, the cooperative work of the various guilds and *Turnvereins*, or the group excursions of youth movements, or the disciplined framework of the army. They have a nature fatally divided against itself, of which Goethe's *Faust* is perhaps the most striking symbol.

This desire for merging in a mass of similar human beings may also be due to the feeling of lack of unity, to the fear that, once Germans are united, an outside power will drive them asunder—a fear which has become just as much of an obsession for the Germans as fear of insecurity is for the French. Lack of unity creates also a tendency to overassertiveness (of the kind usually ascribed by psychiatrists to a feeling of inferiority), which defeats its own ends by provoking counteractions by other peoples. The Germans want to be loved and admired; and they are ready to subjugate and injure others to exact their love and admiration. To a very striking extent, the Japanese suffer from some of the same psychological difficulties as the Germans. The Japanese, too, have a deep sense of political and military insecurity with respect to the Western powers. This sense of insecurity takes the form of aggressiveness toward other people, notably the Chinese, whom the Japanese claim to “love.”

### THE REALISTIC ITALIANS

The Italians, who are a realistic and skeptical people, do not suffer from the excesses of the German temperament. They have a clear sense of the limits of the possible, a sense of proportion which usually guards them against going to extremes. Like the French, most of the Italians want peace. They are

not a military-minded people, and only a handful of leaders, such as Giolitti or Mussolini, has succeeded, at any time, in becoming interested in territorial expansion. They are also a people of simple tastes, who do not demand much from life, and who can extract a great deal of happiness from little things.

But the Italians have a strong sense of drama, and are not averse to a certain amount of oratorical eloquence, theatrical posturing, even exhibitionism, provided it does not lead to dire consequences. Some of them have keenly felt that the British and French, and now the Germans, had little respect for Italy's military prowess, her technical efficiency, and her organizing genius. They have been ready to strain the country's limited resources in order to create, abroad, an impression of power and prestige. When the French and British—who have far too often flouted this desire of Italians for recognition—have failed to be impressed by their efforts, or have even pooh-poohed them, the Fascists felt insulted, and blamed it on the envy of "plutocrats" who refuse to give breathing room to "proletarian" nations like Italy. Modern Italy does not want the Western powers to judge her purely by the archeological remains of the Coliseum or the pictorial beauty of Venice. She wants recognition of her qualities as an up-to-date power, capable of developing a modern industry, a modern military machine, and a modern colonial empire.

### THE ENIGMATIC RUSSIANS

The Russians are often described as an enigma. But behind what Westerners regard as Asiatic deceitfulness they act more or less like other people. This, of course, is in itself enigmatic if we believe that the Russians must continue to act like characters in *The Cherry Orchard*, periodically asking: "What shall we do about life?" which they were forced to stop doing in 1917; or if we think they are going to act purely on the

basis of Communist ideology as defined by Marx and Lenin, which they have not been doing to any extent since Lenin's death in 1923.

The appearance of deceitfulness that Russians have always given—in the days of the Tsars as well as in the days of Stalin—is due partly to Russian suspicion of all foreigners, and a consequent desire to outmaneuver them, and partly to the fact that, except for a very small upper class, Russia has always lived outside the main stream of Western civilization, and therefore acts on other than Western assumptions. This is very baffling to other Europeans, but especially to the French and British, who make less effort than the Germans to understand the non-Western point of view, and expect the Russians to act by their standards, instead of trying to discover the mainsprings of Russian conduct. The Russians like to make big plans, but are not always as eager to fulfill them in practice. The successive Five-Year Plans, so vast in blueprint, so much more modest in performance, were typical of the Russian attitude. But the Russians, unlike the Germans, are temperamentally prepared to accept the failure of their plans without suffering mental agonies, and turn to something else. This lack of continuity obviously militates against efficiency, but has at least the advantage of giving the Russians much greater mental and emotional flexibility than has been the lot of the Germans.

The Russians are a highly adaptable people. They not only get easily acclimatized abroad, but they have great capacity for absorbing other peoples or at least for living with them on relatively peaceful terms. Except for the United States, there is no other country in the world which embraces so many races and nationalities as Russia; and while administrative efforts to achieve unification have been made—through Russification in the days of the Tsars, through Communization in the days of the Soviet government—there has been infinitely less friction between the 150 national groups in-



habiting Russia than there was in the pre-1914 Austro-Hungarian Empire or since 1919 in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In part this is due to the fact that the Russians lack the sense of racial superiority which is so marked among the Germans, and are therefore receptive to the cultures of other peoples.

The Russians also have a vast curiosity about the rest of the world, and an elemental urge to influence the universe through international movements, be it Pan-Slavism or Pan-Communism. But they are essentially a non-military people, to whom the idea of anything except a defensive war is on the whole repugnant. For this reason the foreign policy of the Soviet government (expressed, until the invasion of Finland, in terms of "indivisible peace," "collective security," and "no territorial annexations") corresponded very closely to the desires of the Russian people. Being flexible and adaptable, the Russians, to a much greater degree than the Germans or Italians, are untroubled by the need of saving face, especially because, whatever may be the temporary eclipse of Russia, her vast territory, enormous power, and natural wealth place her indisputably in the ranks of the great powers.

Regardless of the outcome of the Second World War, the world order that will emerge out of this struggle will have to take into account the geographic, economic, political, social and psychological factors we have discussed. Now let us see how the Nazis, on the one hand, and the Western powers, on the other, plan to make use of these factors in building a new world order.

## XI. The Future as the Nazis See It

Nazi plans for the future have been outlined in many books and speeches, notably those of Hitler and Alfred Rosenberg, philosopher of the Nazi party. To the extent permitted by war, some of these plans have already been carried out in conquered Europe. The Nazis want to establish in that continent a sort of political hierarchy, with the German "master race" at the top. Other national groups would be arranged, pyramid fashion, according to their degree of kinship with the Germans, or their readiness to collaborate with the Nazis' "new order."

### THE "MASTER RACE"

Under this system, the Dutch and Scandinavians, who are regarded as akin to the Germans, might—once they abandon their passive resistance—be treated better and granted a larger measure of independence than the Czechs and Poles, who are regarded by the Nazis as permanently inferior, and fit only to be slaves of the German "master race." Of the Latin peoples the French, rather than the Italians, might be given a relatively important role in the "new order"—but only if France turns her back on Western civilization and cuts her historic ties with Britain and the United States. The Spanish people, too, might have a modest part to play in the "new order." Their most important task would be to bring Spanish-speaking Latin America under the influence of German-dominated Europe by stressing the bonds of Spanish culture and tradition between the Old World and the New. If measures taken by the Nazis on the European continent in time of war are a sample of their plans for times of peace, we must expect to see the political pattern already familiar in Germany—rule by self-appointed political party, racial discrimination, suppression of all opposition, censorship, and so on—imposed on conquered Europe.

## A WORLD OF CONTINENTS

Nazi political plans, however, are not limited to the European continent. The Nazis believe that, at the end of the war, the world should be divided into several continental units, each, like Europe, ruled by a "master race" which will have proved its claims to mastery by physical vitality and military prowess.

Before 1939, Hitler apparently hoped to preserve the British Empire more or less intact, on condition that Britain abandon all interference in European affairs. But when Germany became engaged in a struggle to the death with the British Empire, Hitler changed his plans to provide for redivision of the world not with the collaboration of the British but at their expense. Under his scheme Europe would be ruled by the Germans, and "Greater East Asia" by the Japanese—although some Japanese apparently fear that Germany is seeking world domination. Africa was originally to be divided up between Germany and Italy. When Italy herself, in the course of the war, became subject to German control and completely dependent on the Nazis for final victory, it grew increasingly apparent that Africa—described by the Nazis as an "appendage" of Europe—would also be ruled by the Germans. At the outbreak of war Russia was to be temporarily left alone, until such time as her resources of food, oil and raw materials became necessary for the Nazi military machine. But once Germany had invaded Russia, the Nazis indicated that they planned to divide that vast country into two areas: the area west of the Urals, with the grain-growing region of the Ukraine, the oil of the Caucasus, and the mineral resources of the Donetz basin, which would be developed by Germany; and the area east of the Urals, which might be left within the sphere of influence of Japan.

Even during the war, the Nazis tried to give the impression that they would leave the Western Hemisphere untouched—at least until they had accomplished their aims in

Europe. But that does not mean that the Nazis excluded the Western Hemisphere from their plans for a new order. They realized that Europe, even if completely reorganized by the German "master race," is not a self-sufficient continent. Europe lacks many foodstuffs and industrial raw materials which it normally imports from other continents, notably North and South America. The Nazis expect to swing the Western Hemisphere into line with their ideas for redivision of the world by political and economic pressures. The large and active German colonies established for many years in Latin American countries were made an instrument for Nazi propaganda on that continent. The promise of trade with Europe at the close of the war was held out as bait to Latin Americans who might have otherwise opposed Nazism. So far as the United States was concerned, the Nazis believed that this country could be brought, by skilful propaganda, to recognize and collaborate with the "new order" in Europe and Asia. But, if the United States should attempt to prevent free access by a German-dominated Europe to the food and raw materials of Latin America, then the Nazis planned to arouse latent anti-American sentiment in that continent, and isolate the United States from Latin America.

### CONTINENTAL ECONOMIES

In the economic sphere, as in the political sphere, the Nazis think of their "new order" in terms not of individual nations, but of continents. In the future, they believe, the world will be composed of continental economic systems, linked with one another by barter trade. The European continent plus Africa would be organized by Germany primarily for the benefit of the German "master race"—although the Nazis expect that, as a by-product, the living standard of non-Germans would also improve. Similarly, Asia would be reorganized primarily for the benefit of the Japanese. It would be inaccurate to say that

the Nazis have agreed as yet among themselves on a master plan for economic reorganization of the world, or even of Europe, on cessation of hostilities. Many different schemes have been discussed. But the main objective is clear: it is the establishment in Europe of what the Germans call *Grossraumwirtschaft* (large-space economy) under Nazi leadership.

The main outlines of the economic "new order" the Nazis plan to establish in Europe are already indicated by measures taken during the war. To begin with, British and American financial interests would be excluded from Europe. According to the Nazis, European production must be reorganized in such a way as to direct the flow of goods produced by that continent toward Germany, and reduce Europe's dependence on overseas countries, which makes the continent vulnerable to blockade by naval powers like Britain and the United States.

In this reorganized European economy Germany—the most technically advanced state on the continent—would become the principal industrial power. All industries in the conquered countries would be integrated into the German industrial system, either by having to accept German financial participation in their management, or by other methods. Already, German financial groups have obtained a controlling interest in the principal factories and mines of occupied territories. To the economy of the "new order" the conquered countries would apparently contribute the use of their plant and their labor, while the Germans would contribute managerial skill, trade processes and raw materials, and would take charge of marketing the finished products.

#### BACK TO THE LAND

Meanwhile, however, the Nazis are seeking to persuade or coerce the conquered countries to devote their principal efforts to agriculture. The Nazis contend that intensified agricultural production, using modern agronomical advice and machinery



to be provided by Germany, would diminish Europe's dependence on overseas sources of foodstuffs. It would also make it possible for the great industrial Reich to obtain its food and industrial raw materials for an empire under its control on the European continent, instead of a colonial empire overseas, communications with which might always be menaced by Britain or the United States.

As the conquered countries became more dependent on agriculture, they would also become more dependent on the Reich, to which they would have to sell their products at prices fixed by the Nazis. This would be true not only of the primarily agrarian lands of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, but of such highly industrialized countries as France, Belgium and Holland. The Reich, in turn, would enjoy a monopoly of the markets of the conquered countries, which would have to purchase manufactured goods from Germany, rather than from overseas, again at prices fixed by the Nazis. Once the industries of conquered countries had either been curtailed or subordinated to those of the Reich, these countries would be in effect disarmed, since a modern industrial plant is essential for the production of armaments. For an indefinite period they would be reduced to the status of colonies of the Reich.

#### GERMAN CONTROL OF EUROPE'S LABOR

The expanded German empire would be in a position to use not only the food and raw material resources of the entire continent, but also its resources of man power. Skilled workers previously employed in the industries of conquered countries have already been offered a choice between starvation, return to agriculture (for which they might be unfitted), or work in German factories at wages fixed by the Nazis. Thousands of them, confronted with this choice, are working in Germany, thus releasing German labor for service with the armed forces.

It is conceivable that, at the end of the war, the Nazis might find it necessary to perpetuate their present system, if only to avoid disastrous post-war dislocation as a result of demobilization. Industrial and agricultural work would then continue to be performed by the conquered peoples, while the German "master race" would devote itself to the tasks of policing and administering its continental empire. Some Nazi leaders, however, have warned the Germans they must not fall into the "error of the English," and must continue to work in order to maintain their hard-won domination.

### NAZI PLANS FOR THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Nazi plans for economic relations between continental units at the close of the war have not yet been clearly formulated. Nazi spokesmen, however, have indicated that they intend to maintain and develop relations with overseas regions, notably Latin America. Rejecting the use of gold in international exchanges, the Nazis plan to expand their system of bilateral trade treaties and clearing agreements. Under these arrangements, all transactions between Germany and other countries would be liquidated not by transfers of currency but by barter of goods. This system, according to the Nazis, would break "the economic monopoly" of Britain and the United States, who in the past have furnished loans to backward areas. If Germany obtains access to gold resources she has hitherto lacked, however, she may be less contemptuous of that metal, and more prepared to use it in international transactions.

In discussing some of the post-war problems with American business representatives, Nazi spokesmen have indicated that they would be ready, once peace has been established, to share trade in backward regions with the United States. Sincere as these intentions may be, the Nazis would immediately enjoy two important advantages over the United States. First, Germany has already organized a vast network of controls, which

would permit German-dominated Europe to function as a solid economic bloc, and not as a mass of conflicting economic interests, such as exists in the United States. Second, she would be able to draw on a reservoir of cheap labor and raw materials in the conquered countries under her control. The Nazis could consequently offer manufactured goods to backward areas at prices much lower than those of the United States—unless, meanwhile, this country accepts a form of controlled economy comparable to that of Germany, and American manufacturers reduce prices and wages, with corresponding reduction in our standard of living. Even if this country should avoid active participation in the war, and succeed in organizing the Western Hemisphere under its control, as Germany plans to organize Europe and Africa, competition with a greater German economic empire, having Europe as its base and the world as its sphere of influence, would confront the United States with fundamental political and economic problems.

## **XII. The Future as Others See It**

In discussing the shape of things to come, British and American planners agree with the Nazis that the day of small national units, each seeking to preserve political and economic independence by fiercely nationalistic methods, is past. If the various national groups—especially those east of Germany, which have become inextricably mingled by successive migrations—are to preserve some measure of independence, they must be linked with others into larger units. Where Anglo-American planners differ fundamentally from the Nazis is regarding the *methods* by which national groups might be integrated into the larger units of the future. They believe that nations should be regrouped not on the basis of domination

by a "master race," as proposed by the Nazis, but on a basis of equality and voluntary collaboration.

Unlike the Nazis, British and American planners, influenced by a long tradition of sea power, think in terms of *intercontinental* arrangements. Their plans take into account the dependence of Britain, the British Dominions and the United States on sea communications for purposes both of commerce and defense. Their opposition to purely continental arrangements is shared by Europe's seafaring countries, notably Holland and Norway. By contrast, a section of opinion in France, which has long oscillated between dreams of continental leadership and overseas empire, favors abandonment of connections with overseas countries, and collaboration with Germany in a continental "new order."

Anglo-American plans for a new political order range all the way from reorganization and reform of the League of Nations, possibly under another name, to acceptance by some groups in the United States of the idea of continental units, with the proposal that this country leave Europe and Africa to Germany and Asia to Japan, and concentrate on the task of "integrating" the Western Hemisphere. We have looked at Nazi blueprints of a new world order. Let us now look over some of the blueprints drawn up in Britain and the United States.

#### A MORE EFFECTIVE LEAGUE OF NATIONS?

Proposals for reform and reorganization of the League are based on the assumption that, after the war, it will still be necessary to establish an international organization, whatever its name, which would serve as an over-all framework for the regional and continental units now under discussion; and that the League of Nations, with all its admitted defects, provides a wealth of practical experience for future international organization.

There are two general approaches to the task of League reorganization and reform. One is to strengthen the League at the points where it revealed its principal weaknesses. The advocates of this view would give the League compulsory jurisdiction in the settlement of disputes; would place at its disposal an international police force, preferably an air force; would create effective League machinery for economic cooperation; and would provide the League with adequate methods for peaceful change. All these reforms would require far greater sacrifices of national sovereignty than League members were ready to make before 1939, and a far greater measure of international planning and control over armaments and economic resources than has hitherto been developed.

### COMPROMISING WITH PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES

Because of these practical difficulties, more cautious supporters of League reform would, on the contrary, reduce the political and military functions of the League of Nations, and strengthen its work on economic and social problems, in which it had already displayed efficiency and imagination when not hampered by political differences between its member states. It has therefore been suggested that an "Economic League," separate from a "Political League," should be established, which could embrace all countries without the restrictions imposed by the predominantly political character of the old League of Nations. In 1939 a special committee of the League recommended the establishment of a new Central Committee for Economic and Social Questions which would have an independent status and separate membership not unlike those of the International Labor Office, of which the United States is a member.

Proposals for segregation and expansion of the League's economic and social functions are usually combined with proposals for continuance and expansion of the work of the




I. L. O. The I. L. O., unlike the League, represents the interests not only of governments but also of industry and labor. The fact that the I. L. O. and some economic and social sections of the League have been transferred since the war from Geneva to Canada and the United States, respectively, gives practical significance to these proposals. But, in discussing plans for a more effective League of Nations, we must again remember that it will not be enough to change the *machinery* of international relations. We shall first of all have to change the *spirit* of these relations.

### FEDERAL UNION OF DEMOCRACIES

The only alternative so far proposed to regional arrangements, on the one hand, and world-wide organization, on the other, is the group of projects in Britain and the United States known under the general name of Federal Union. In his original plan of "Union Now," Clarence Streit proposed the union of European democracies with Britain, the British Dominions and the United States. Following the conquest of Western and Northern Europe by Germany in the spring of 1940, Mr. Streit revised his plan, which now calls for immediate union of the United States with Britain, Canada, Eire, the Union of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. France, Belgium, Holland, Norway and Denmark, originally included in Union Now, would join as soon as they were freed of German occupation.

In American proposals for "Union Now with Britain" the provisional constitution of the Union is based on that of the United States. Rights not delegated to the Union would be reserved to the states. The Union would guarantee a democratic form of government to its member states, and only states which had developed democratic institutions would be admitted to the Union. Legislative power would be vested in a unicameral legislature elected on a basis of population. Execu-

# UNION NOW WITH BRITAIN



tive power would be vested in a board of five members, two to be elected by the legislature, and three by the people. This board would have functions similar to those of the President of the United States. Judicial power would be vested in a high court, with powers similar to those of the Supreme Court of the United States.

American advocates of Federal Union contend that Federal Union, based on popular representation, would be a great

advance both over an alliance with the British democracies, and over a league of sovereign states, such as the League of Nations. Many Britishers agree with this project on fundamentals, but are inclined to feel that the United States is not yet ready for such close union with Britain and the British Dominions as that advocated by Mr. Streit; that Britain has many ties with a potential European federation, which they do not want to jeopardize by close union with countries outside Europe; and that the British are better adapted for the kind of organization developed by the British Commonwealth of Nations than for a federation based on the experience of America.

#### WHAT THE CRITICS SAY

Critics of Federal Union in the United States point out that it fails to come to grips with major problems such as the role Germany may play after the war, the relationship of the proposed Union to Latin American countries, the Soviet Union and Japan, and the economic problems that underlie the present conflict. By neglecting these problems, it is asserted, Federal Union constitutes a form of escapism, and offers the kind of oversimplified "solution" that many Americans who are alarmed by the complexity of international relations would like to find. It is also pointed out that, by emphasizing collaboration between English-speaking and "democratic" peoples, Federal Union creates fear among other countries—notably in Latin America—that a British victory achieved with the aid of the British Dominions and the United States would result in Anglo-Saxon domination of the world, which many non-Anglo-Saxons find no more palatable than German domination. It is also argued that Federal Union dismisses too summarily the experience of the League of Nations.

To these, and other criticisms, proponents of Federal Union say that no more practicable proposal has yet been advanced;

and that a start must be made somewhere toward international organization, for which a union of English-speaking and democratic peoples would serve as an important nucleus. But again, as in the case of League reorganization, we must remember that it would not be enough to create new machinery, unless there were a will to make the machinery work.

### IF REGIONALISM, WHAT KIND?

In contrast to proposals for a refurbished League or a brand-new Federal Union of Democracies, some American planners have discussed the possibility of reorganizing the world by regions, each of which would be unified within its geographic boundaries, and would be linked to other regions by trade and some form of international machinery. Advocates of regionalism cannot be accused of supporting, consciously at least, Nazi theories of "master race" domination and racial discrimination. But they believe that, even if Nazism be defeated, Germany may in the natural course of events exercise ascendancy over Europe, and Japan over Asia. They suggest that, as a counterpoise, the United States should "integrate" the Western Hemisphere in such a way that the continents of North and South America may achieve relative self-sufficiency, which would make them invulnerable to political and economic pressures from other continents.

Supporters of Western Hemisphere "integration" are by no means of one mind as to the geographical scope of the Hemisphere. Some would include Canada, the Panama Canal, American bases in British Western Hemisphere possessions, and Central American countries adjoining the Panama Canal. Others would stretch the "continent" to include all of Latin America above the "bulge" of Brazil, advocating "quarter-sphere" defense. Still others would take in all of the Western Hemisphere. The United States, according to these theories, should be prepared to build sufficient defenses to protect itself



against what Mr. Lindbergh has described, without naming them, as "the strongest powers in Europe and Asia."

### "INTEGRATION" OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

This concept of Western Hemisphere "integration," which looks beyond the boundaries of the continental United States, has to a marked extent displaced the post-1919 concept of American isolation. It indicates that, even if the American public may hesitate to accept responsibilities for reconstruction of Europe or Asia, it is ready to take the responsibility for reconstruction of the Western Hemisphere. Plans for Western Hemisphere "integration" fit in with Nazi plans for division of the world into continental units. Some of the South American countries, however, might be reluctant to become part and parcel of a "continental" unit sponsored by North Americans who, in their eyes, might appear to be assuming the role of a "master race." As has happened in Europe, Asia and Africa, continental "integration" might therefore involve, in its initial stages at least, a policy of imperialism and armed intervention in recalcitrant countries. Yet it is also conceivable that, by tactful and generous interpretation of the doctrines of Pan-Americanism, the United States might succeed in bringing the countries of the Western Hemisphere together into close political and economic collaboration for their mutual benefit. The experience already acquired through the work of joint Canadian-American defense and economic committees might be usefully applied in the relations of the United States with other countries of the Western Hemisphere.

But, in discussing what the United States may contribute toward post-war reconstruction of the Western Hemisphere, we must remember that many of these countries are by no means resigned to isolation in this Hemisphere. Their attitude toward North American plans for a post-war order will depend, first, on the outcome of the war; second, on what



## WHAT KIND OF FEDERATED EUROPE?



they think of the sincerity of the United States in its relations with the countries south of us; and third, on the form of reorganization that may come, after the war, in other continents.

### WHAT KIND OF EUROPEAN FEDERATION?

If the United States has begun to understand that it must take some measure of responsibility for the future of the Western Hemisphere, Britain has also begun to understand that, in the post-war period, she will have to assume some measure of responsibility for the future of Europe. Already, in the midst of war, many Britishers are discussing the kind of reorganization that might take place on the continent once Hitler has been defeated.

By recognizing European governments-in-exile as the legitimate rulers of their respective occupied countries, Britain has indicated that she will endeavor to "restore" these countries when she has defeated Hitler. This possibility of restoration squarely challenges Nazi plans for the establishment of a German-dominated "new order" on the continent, and raises far-reaching questions.

It would be impossible to answer all of these questions in advance. But many of them have already been discussed by the British and by the exiled governments in London. Some planners have advocated a federation between Britain and France, membership in which would be open to other states, with common ownership of colonial possessions. Others urge a strong European federation functioning within a world organization, and grouping within its framework smaller regional unions—Scandinavian, Baltic, Danubian, Balkan, and so on. Such a federation, it is believed, might counterbalance the numerical preponderance of both Germany and the Soviet Union. Already, on November 11, 1940, the exiled governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia signed an agreement in which they undertook to enter into "close political and economic association, which would become the basis of a New Order in Europe and a guarantee of its stability."

By contrast, British planners favor a federation of Western Europe, which would exclude Germany and Russia, but would function within a world-wide organization. Some plans would link Britain with the United States and the British Dominions, leaving Europe to form its own federation; others would include Britain in the European federation, leaving the United States and the British Dominions to join a reformed and reorganized League of Nations. Until Germany's invasion of Russia in June 1941, most British planners tended to exclude Russia from a European federation, however it might be formed, on the ground that Russia is herself a continent,

with a huge population containing Asiatic as well as European races, and that her admission would throw the European federation out of balance.

### BRITAIN'S RESPONSIBILITY

On one point, however, there seems to be agreement both in Britain and among the exiled governments of European countries: that, in case of Hitler's defeat, Britain must assume responsibility for European reconstruction. Most Britishers, however, believe that, if Britain assumes this task, she must have the support of the British Dominions and the United States, although there is difference of opinion as to the form this support should take—moral, or military, or economic, or all three combined. Those Americans who have given serious thought to the matter point out that, if the United States is to give Britain the support she will need for the reconstruction of Europe, this country, in turn, must make economic readjustments and sacrifices that would permit rehabilitation and healthy development of other continents. They also believe that, political realities being what they are, no United States government could assume or carry out far-reaching commitments with respect to Europe—or other continents—unless it could convince American public opinion that such commitments would assure a period of genuine peace and international order.

Even this brief analysis of various plans for regional groupings in this or that continent indicates that it would be impossible to create self-sufficient regional or continental systems after the war. Either the newly created continental units would become involved in conflict with one another—thus substituting inter-continental for interstate wars. Or else they would have to be linked by a vast network of political, economic and other ties which would permit peaceful interchange of goods and ideas between the various continents. Thus every plan

for regional or continental systems only points up the need for some form of intercontinental collaboration, if intercontinental conflicts are to be avoided.

### NEW IDEAS ABOUT ECONOMICS

In discussing the post-war economic order, as in discussing the post-war political order, Anglo-American planners agree with the Nazis that it will be impossible and undesirable, at the end of the war, to restore an international economic system based on small national units struggling with each other for markets and raw materials, and striving to shut one another's exports out by tariff walls, currency restrictions, and other forms of national control. Both groups look toward the formation of larger economic units, corresponding roughly to the larger political units contemplated for the post-war period, and a greater measure of planning and coordination of the world's resources than has ever been undertaken in the past.

But here again, as with respect to the post-war political order, German and Anglo-American planners differ fundamentally regarding the *methods* to be used to achieve their objectives. True, British and American planners differ among themselves, like the Nazis, regarding these methods. But while the Nazis are outwardly united in promoting a totalitarian system, nationally and internationally, Anglo-American planners range all the way from those who would restore *laissez-faire* capitalism to those who would like to experiment with some form of socialism or communism. The kind of new order envisaged by Conservative members of the British Cabinet, for example, would not coincide with that contemplated by Ernest Bevin, British Minister of Labor, and other representatives of the Labor party. In the United States, where public opinion is already split several ways on the relative merits and demerits of the New Deal, some leaders have raised ques-

tions about aid to Britain on the ground that that country is moving toward socialism; while others have opposed aid to Britain on the ground that the British are still wedded to a semi-feudal social structure which does not correspond to the American concept of modern democracy.

### FREE ENTERPRISE OR INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS?

This cleavage is also revealed in plans for an international economic order. Some Britishers and Americans believe that the only hope for peaceful development after the war is restoration of "free enterprise" and liberation of international trade from all the controls and restrictions that have been imposed on it since 1919. They would therefore oppose controls both within nations and among nations, and some of them view with alarm the controls already adopted by Britain and the United States for war purposes, on the ground that these will lead either to fascism or socialism.

Others, on the contrary, favor much greater international control than in the past over all the essential elements of production and distribution—raw materials, markets, foreign exchange, and credit. These controls, they urge, should be administered not by individual nations at the behest of this or that group of national traders, industrialists, or bankers, as in the past, but by some form of International Authority representing labor, industry, finance and consumers.

This International Authority would open backward regions to the capital, labor and managerial talents of the entire world. It would also pool the raw materials of the entire world for distribution among all peoples on a basis of need. Such a system envisages the establishment of an international bank, with subsidiary banks in various regions; regulation of production and distribution of the principal foodstuffs and raw materials; organized migration, which would permit transfer of labor to points where it was most needed, in an effort to



reduce unemployment and to bring labor into newly developed regions; and administration of health and social welfare measures on an international scale, in an effort to establish uniform minimum standards of nutrition, wages, housing, educational and recreational opportunities. Such a system also presupposes the existence of an international political organization, whatever its form or name, within the framework of which an international economic organization could function. What is even more important, it presupposes that nations will voluntarily surrender a measure of political sovereignty, and accept far-reaching international controls.

In comparing Nazi and Anglo-American plans for the post-war order, we must remember that the choice is not between Hitler's "new order," based on redivision of the world into continents, and return to an international society composed of compartmentalized national states each desperately striving to achieve political and economic self-sufficiency. *The choice is between Hitler's "new order," and a super-national organization based on the voluntary collaboration of free peoples, who would be concerned not merely with their own rights and privileges, as they have been in the past, but with the welfare of international society as a whole, to be achieved by peaceful means.*

### **XIII. The Problem of Germany**

But all the blueprints for a post-war order drawn up by Anglo-American planners depend for their realization on the way in which Germany—and Japan—are dealt with in case of Nazi defeat. Some people talk lightly about the need of “destroying” the Germans or “dismembering” Germany before any progress can be made toward world stabilization. And we must realize that millions of people in the occupied countries of Europe probably thirst for vengeance on their German conquerors. Yet it is obvious that destruction of all Germans or permanent subjugation of Germany—desirable as it may seem to some people in the midst of war—would be impracticable. How, then, should Britain and her allies deal with Germany after the war, to prevent the recurrence of the military adventures on which the German Empire has embarked three times within seventy years—in 1870, 1914, and 1939?

Some anti-Nazi Germans believe that a sharp distinction should be drawn in any program of peace aims between the Nazis and the German people. They declare that the objective of Britain and her allies should be the destruction of Nazism, but not of Germany. The Western powers, they contend, should convince the Germans that the disappearance of the Nazi regime “will be the end of defeat.” Other anti-Nazi Germans believe that the only solution of the German problem is to break up Germany into the tiny states of which she was composed before her unification by Bismarck in 1870, and to place the German states under foreign military control for an indefinite period.

#### **REPRESSION OR RECONCILIATION**

Non-Germans, both in Europe and in other continents, remain divided on the question whether the best method of dealing with the Germans after the war would be repression (advo-

cated in 1919 by the French), or reconciliation (advocated in 1919 by the British). They have not yet found answers to the many questions raised by the problem of Germany. Should Germany be subjected to foreign military control for a period of, say, fifty years, on the theory that she may by that time have forsworn militarism, and adopted a cooperative attitude toward other countries? Can the clock of history be turned back, and an effort made to break up Germany, in the hope that a federated Germany freed from Prussia's domination could then be successfully integrated into a federated Europe? Or should Germany's preponderance in terms of population and technical skill be recognized, and Germany be assigned a dominant role in the European federation, on condition that she undertakes to respect the rights of other nations and abandons Nazi theories of racial discrimination?

There is still another set of questions that baffles British and American planners. If Hitler is defeated, with what elements in Germany should Britain and her allies try to reach a settlement? Would the German army, which may not share all the ideas of the Nazis, but has certainly supported their nationalist and militarist aspirations, be recognized as Hitler's successor? Or would the German army merely continue Germany's nationalist and militarist program, even if shorn of Nazi racial theories? If Britain and her allies must look for elements outside the army with which to negotiate, can these be found among business men, or labor groups? Or has the entire German population—especially the young generation—been so permeated with Nazi ideas that there are no elements with which the Western powers could reach an understanding?

To these and other questions no one clear answer is given by plans discussed in Britain and the United States, or among exiled leaders of Europe's conquered countries. Through force of necessity, the British have had to do a great deal of thinking about the German problem. Much as they detest Nazism,

the British people have on the whole shown a remarkable lack of vindictiveness toward the German people. For the most part, the British recognize the necessity of integrating Germany, in one way or another, into any proposed European federation. While some British planners believe that Germany's military power should be curtailed through disarmament and demobilization of German wartime industry, they are reluctant to undertake repression of Germany for any length of time following the end of hostilities.

### TWO LINES OF APPROACH

The Atlantic Charter, drawn up by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, indicates two possible lines of approach toward the German problem: unilateral disarmament of Germany during a period of reconstruction; and then efforts, in the long run, to provide Germany with free access to raw materials and other economic opportunities. The Charter provides for unilateral disarmament of Germany (exactly what was done in 1919), "*until such time as general conditions of peace have been established.*" We may assume that during this period, whose duration remains indefinite, Britain and her allies would pool their military resources to form an international police force, which would be used to police Europe, and possibly other warring continents. At the same time, most Britishers appear to believe that during the period of receivership the Germans should be given an opportunity to develop, without outside compulsion, organs of self-government representative of the people, with whom the rest of the world could ultimately reach a peace settlement.

This future settlement, as indicated in the Atlantic Charter, would endeavor to provide for long-term reconstruction not only of Europe, but of the world. It would seek to equalize the position of all countries with respect to raw materials, migration of populations and access to colonial territories, in

an attempt to remove some of the most outspoken grievances of Germany, Italy and Japan. It would require, presumably, not only pledges of good conduct by Germany, Italy and Japan, but also concrete evidence of readiness on the part of Britain, the United States and the British Dominions to make economic and financial contributions for the common good. It would require, in addition, social reorganization in all countries to meet the needs of a new world order.

#### **XIV. How Will America Help to Build?**

In summing up the various plans that have been made in Britain and the United States for post-war reconstruction, it is possible to distinguish between two sets of programs that might be adopted in case of Nazi defeat: (1) a short-term program for the period of receivership which is generally expected to elapse between the end of actual hostilities and the summoning of a peace conference; and (2) a long-term program which could be formulated at a peace conference free from the bitterness generated by war. It is important to distinguish between these two sets of programs before discussing how the United States can contribute to post-war reconstruction.

##### **A SHORT-TERM PROGRAM**

The short-term program, designed to permit transition from a war to a peace footing, might include the following measures:

1. **Termination of Nazi power by demobilization of the German army and the Nazi secret police.** This disarmament would be followed, or accompanied, as the case might be, by the gradual development of German self-governing bodies to which power in Germany could be transferred by Brit-



ain and her allies at the end of the period of receivership. Such gradual transition, it is thought, would obviate the difficulties created at the close of the First World War, when, in the hope of placating the Allies, the Germans hastily set up the Weimar Republic, which had no roots in the political traditions of Germany. In their resentment at the terms of the Versailles settlement, many Germans then turned not only against the Allies, but also against the Weimar Republic, and this resentment greatly aided the rise of Nazism.

2. Retention of wartime controls over raw materials, shipping, foreign trade, foreign exchange, and so on, to prevent sudden dislocation of national and international economy, and resulting economic depression of disastrous proportions throughout the world. Steps have already been taken by Britain, with the cooperation of the United States and the British Dominions, to prepare a pool of foodstuffs, which could be gradually distributed after the war, in such a way as both to satisfy the needs of Europe and Asia, and to prevent sudden dislocation of prices. Similar measures might be adopted with respect to disposal of the principal industrial raw materials which will be needed for post-war reconstruction.

3. Establishment of an emergency Military Administration, international in composition, which would keep order in Europe, including Germany. Such an administration, it is hoped, would prevent disorders and lawless seizures of territory, and would enable the occupied countries, as well as Germany, gradually to resume normal political and economic activities. This administration would be supported by an international police force.

4. Establishment of an International Reconstruction Commission composed of political, economic and medical experts, for the administration of civil affairs. This Commission would have, as one of its principal tasks, the distribution of food, clothing and medical assistance to the peoples of

Europe, including Germans, on a basis of equality. Such measures, it is hoped, would forestall the bitterness created in Germany after 1919 by near-starvation; and assure the Germans that, while military domination by Germany would not be tolerated, the final settlement to be discussed at the peace conference would not be a vindictive peace.

### A LONG-TERM PROGRAM

The long-term program, which would be the culmination, rather than the starting point, of a period of reconstruction, might include the following measures:

1. Provision for cultural autonomy of national groups, combined with their political integration into one or more regional systems in which they could be assured a minimum of security and economic stability.

2. Development of political and economic ties between the new system or systems formed in Europe with regional systems in Asia and the Western Hemisphere (for example the Pan American Union), in such a way that each continent would have its own machinery for settlement of purely continental questions, but would join with others for the peaceful adjustment of inter-continental political and economic problems.

3. Establishment of an International Authority, representing governments, producers, consumers and labor, which would regulate access to raw materials, migration of populations, health and social welfare.

4. Creation of machinery by the advanced states for the joint development of backward areas—in the Balkans, Latin America, Asia, Africa—this development to be determined not merely by the interests of individual nations or economic groups within nations, but by the welfare of the backward peoples as well.

5. Eventual disarmament of all countries, including the

victors, accompanied by the establishment of a permanent international police force. This police force could be used on a regional basis, but under international control, to prevent infractions by force of the world order developed during the period of receivership.

6. Development of peaceful procedures for making changes in this world order, as the need may arise.

#### WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES READY TO DO?

Neither the short-term nor the long-term plans for post-war reconstruction, it is generally admitted, can be effectively carried out without some measure of participation by the United States. Even assuming that the Nazi regime is overthrown, and that Britain emerges from the war without further grave impairment of her territory and manpower, the British will have suffered such heavy material losses that they will need a long period of recuperation. Moreover, a single-handed attempt by Britain to assume the receivership of the European continent would seem suspect not only to a defeated Germany, but also to elements in other countries who continue to distrust Britain's motives.

The British themselves would apparently prefer to have the United States and the British Dominions share the burdens and responsibilities of post-war reconstruction. The question that confronts the American public is the degree of participation that this country would be able and willing to undertake once war is over.

#### A PARADOXICAL ATTITUDE

The attitude of Americans toward Europe continues to puzzle many Europeans. On the one hand, few peoples in the world have displayed such generous concern for the material needs of others as Americans have again and again in the past twenty-five years, when they have contributed millions of dollars to

various relief projects. On the other hand, most Americans, including those directly engaged in relief work, have apparently felt that their responsibility stopped at taking care of the victims of this or that international catastrophe, and have been reluctant to assume responsibility for measures that might have prevented these recurring catastrophes. In other words, they have dealt with the victims of international epidemics, but have neglected measures of preventive medicine in inter-



national relations. Many Americans still look on events in Europe as if they were being acted out on a stage, to be hissed or applauded as the case might be, but in no sense involving the Ameri-

can spectators behind the footlights. This attitude, which combines moralizing about how other people should act and an ever-generous readiness to give material aid with a striking degree of political irresponsibility, seems incomprehensible and even downright dangerous to Europeans who have lived for many years in the midst of stark tragedy.

It would be unfair to scold the American public for its attitude, which has been shaped by many factors: geographic distance from Europe, unrivaled economic prosperity, widespread ignorance (which often seems like bliss) of what Europe's travail really means. But it is fair to point out that, sooner or later, the United States will have to make a choice of policies. Either it can adopt a policy of strict isolation—and that means not only political isolation, but surrender of foreign markets and abandonment of efforts at moral intervention in

other parts of the world; or else it can gradually assume the political responsibilities implicit in its desire to carry on trade with other countries and to have something to say regarding the general course of world affairs.

#### THE U.S. AND THE SHORT-TERM PROGRAM

So far as short-term plans for post-war reconstruction are concerned, the United States—unless it reverts to strict isolation—would probably want to carry on, into the period following the war, the wartime measures of economic and financial collaboration it has developed in concert with Britain and the British Dominions. Such action would seem dictated by considerations of self-defense against the effects of post-war dislocation, if by no other motive. It is also probable that the United States would want to be represented on an International Reconstruction Commission, and would in fact make the principal contribution to its work so far as food, relief and health measures are concerned. The really difficult decision would come on the question whether the United States would also participate in the temporary Military Administration that might be set up on the continent for the period of receivership. Such participation would involve direct American responsibility for keeping law and order on the continent, and especially in Germany, until a peace settlement has been formulated, and would probably necessitate the dispatch to Europe of an American military force which would form part of the projected international police force.

#### THE U.S. AND THE LONG-TERM PROGRAM

The decision that the United States would reach on this point would determine its attitude toward long-term plans for post-war reconstruction. If this country had become gradually accustomed, during the period of receivership, to concerning itself with the political, economic and social problems of other



continents, the transition to collaboration with these continents through regional and world-wide organizations might prove almost imperceptible. Of course, non-Americans must always remember that any decision made by the executive of the United States may be rejected by a one-third vote of the Senate, as happened in the case of the Versailles settlement. But the decision of the Senate, in turn, will be affected by the trend of public opinion. The future course of the United States will thus depend, in the final analysis, on what the American people want to do about post-war reconstruction. The American people may never develop as close an interest in the affairs of Europe and Asia as, for example, they are now developing in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. Yet it may also turn out that the American people will no longer be as indifferent to the destiny of Europe and Asia as they tried to be during the "Long Armistice." There is a middle road between Anglo-American rule over Europe, Asia, Africa and South America, and complete isolation—namely, a reasonable measure of co-operation by the United States in measures devised to assure the political security, economic development, and social well-being of these continents.

To many Americans, the task of reconstruction may appear staggering, in fact impossible. There is no doubt that it is a staggering task. But in weighing its possibilities, we must always remember that Hitler is not only ready, but eager, to undertake the reorganization of Europe and the world on the Nazi pattern. Failure to meet Hitler's challenge in these universal terms may mean the defeat of the Western powers—not necessarily on the battlefield, but by default; because the Western peoples would have demonstrated that they lack the courage, the vision and the fortitude to set forth, as earlier pioneers and pilgrims in their history have done, toward the new horizons of democracy.

## SUGGESTED READING

- BECKER, CARL L. *Modern Democracy*. New Haven. Yale University Press. 1941. Excellent, concise analysis of the problems confronted by democracy in the twentieth century. Very readable.
- BIRDSALL, PAUL. *Versailles Twenty Years After*. New York. Reynal and Hitchcock. 1941. Interesting analysis of the good and bad points of the Versailles settlement, by an author who thinks President Wilson's ideas offer a good start for the future. Advanced, but readable.
- CECIL, VISCOUNT. *A Great Experiment*. New York. Oxford University Press. 1941. A history of the League of Nations, and an evaluation of its work, by one of its leading British advocates, who continues to believe in the League idea. Technical.
- FERRERO, GUGLIELMO. *The Reconstruction of Europe*. New York. Putnam. 1941. The story of the Congress of Vienna of 1815, told by an Italian historian who believes that the problems of rebuilding Europe after Napoleon offer some striking parallels to the problems of our times. Technical and one-sided, but contains many interesting comparisons between the two periods.
- HARSCH, JOSEPH C. *Pattern of Conquest*. New York. Doubleday Doran. 1941. Valuable analysis of Nazi plans for a "new order," by the former *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent in Berlin. Very readable.
- HITLER, ADOLF. *Mein Kampf*. New York. Reynal & Hitchcock. 1939.
- LASKI, HAROLD J. *Where Do We Go From Here?* New York. Viking. 1940. A British Laborite who admires the Soviet system presents provocative ideas regarding post-war reconstruction on a basis which would combine political democracy with economic planning. Readable.
- MILLER, DOUGLAS. *You Can't Do Business with Hitler*. Boston. Little Brown. 1941. A former American commercial attaché in Berlin tells why he believes that, if the Nazis win the war, it will be impossible for the United States, with its present economic system, to do business with Hitler's "new order." Technical but readable.
- NEVINS, ALLAN. *This Is England Today*. New York. Scribner. 1941. Brief and illuminating analysis of the political, economic and social changes that are taking place in Britain as a result of the war, by a distinguished American historian. Popular and readable.
- PEFFER, NATHANIEL. *Prerequisites to Peace in the Far East*. New York. Institute of Pacific Relations. 1940. Concise and balanced picture of the respective interests of China and Japan, and how they could be adjusted under a peace settlement if the Western powers adopted a disinterested attitude toward the Far East. Advanced, but readable.
- PRIESTLEY, J. B. *Out of the People*. New York. Harper. 1941. A well-known British novelist, now equally well-known as a broadcaster, gives a warm-hearted account of the change in the temper of the British people wrought by the war, and of the effect this may have on post-war reconstruction. Very popular and readable. Should be read in conjunction with Allan Nevins' more factual *This is England Today*.

REVEILLE, THOMAS. *The Spoil of Europe*. New York. Norton. 1941. Graphic picture, by an author who writes under a pseudonym, of the methods by which the Nazis are reorganizing the conquered countries of Europe as a preliminary step toward construction of their economic "new order." Technical, but readable.

STOWE, LELAND. *No Other Road to Freedom*. New York. Knopf. 1941. Eyewitness account, shot through with emotion, of conditions in the conquered countries of Europe, especially Norway and Greece, by a correspondent of *The Chicago Daily News*, who was once an isolationist, but now urges intervention by the United States. Very readable.

STREIT, CLARENCE K. *Union Now with Britain*. New York. Harper. 1941. Detailed plan for wartime union between the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations, by the author of *Union Now*, published by Harper in 1939.

VITON, ALBERT. "Postwar Imperialism: A Democratic Solution," *Asia*, August 1941. An interesting and thought-stimulating article.

WILLIAMS, FRANCIS. *War by Revolution*. New York. Viking. 1941. A British journalist urges the Western powers to wrest the weapon of revolutionary propaganda from the Nazis, and to take the leadership of the conquered peoples of Europe in a double campaign—against Nazism and for establishment of a democratic "new order." Readable.

WELLS, H. G. *The New World Order*. New York. Knopf. 1940. One of the literary prophets of the twentieth century outlines his hopes for a new order where reason, not force, would prevail. Readable.

The following HEADLINE BOOKS could be usefully read in connection with *The Struggle for World Order: The Peace That Failed; Human Dynamite; In Quest of Empire; Battles Without Bullets; Bricks Without Mortar; and Challenge to the Americas*.





